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LAW AND RELIGION: IS RECONCILIATION
STILL POSSIBLE?
R. Randall Rainey, S.J *
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article I explore the relation of law and religion from an
interdisciplinary perspective. In considering this general topic, it is clear
that fruitful exchanges between these two aspects of human experience
have been characteristic of the American experiment in democratic gov-
ernance. Legislators, jurists, and legal scholars have drawn upon the in-
tellectual and moral resources of various religious traditions in
addressing the problems of constitutional interpretation,' the definition
of religion,2 and questions of justice.'
Theologians, philosophers, and religious leaders from diverse reli-
gious traditions contribute regularly to the legal structure of church-state
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University; B.A., University of Texas at Austin,
1974; J.D., Loyola Law School (New Orleans), 1982; M. Div., Weston School of Theology
(Cambridge, Mass.), 1987; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1988; S.T.M., The Jesuit School of Theol-
ogy at Berkeley, 1990. I am thankful for the generosity of my colleagues John E. Dunsford,
John M. Griesbach, Josef Rohlick, William R. Rehg, S.J., and Dennis Tuchler who gave me
the benefit of their criticism of earlier drafts of this Article and many helpful suggestions. I am
also grateful for the valuable research assistance of David Miller and Jennifer Spreng.
1. For an earlier appeal to the philosophical and religious foundations of constitutional
law, see Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1928); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW
139 (1988) (stating that "the activity of interpreting [a sacred text] in the life of a religious
community" is similar in function to interpretation of Constitution in American political com-
munity); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). In the
context of constitutional adjudication, religious organizations regularly submit amicus curiae
briefs in cases having substantive moral or religious significance.
2. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 249-67 (1989) (detailing Court's various attempts to define
religion and its periodic reliance upon theological definitions); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); Jesse H. Choper, Defining Religion in
the First Amendment, 1982 ILL. L. REV. 579; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. RyV. 753 (1984).
3. The influence of St. Thomas Aquinas upon Western jurisprudence is extraordinarily
deep. For an excellent recent translation and commentary on the writings of St. Thomas rele-
vant to the law, see ST. THOMAS AQUINA, TREATISE ON LAW (R.J. Henle, S.J. ed. & trans.,
Notre Dame Press 1993). For an illuminating historical examination of the ecclesiastical and
theological origins of the rule of law in Western civilization, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION 273-94 (1982).
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relations,4 to an exposition of the moral issues bearing upon the founda-
tions and limits of law regarding complex social problems,' and to the
development of public policies, both foreign and domestic, that advance
social justice and world peace.6
The metaphysical and anthropological suppositions of this dynamic
intellectual, moral, and political dialogue are that the life of the spirit is
real, that religious experience is intelligible, and that authentic religious
insights into the human condition are of great value to the political com-
munity.7 This tradition also assumes that the practice of true religion is
essential to the moral well-being of individuals, of families, and of society
at large;8 that religious-ethical discourse is relevant to the formation of
4. See, ag., JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J., AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY (1982) (il-
lustrating American-Catholic contribution to development of democratic character and civic
virtue); J. Bryan Hehir, The Right and Competence of the Church, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 55 (John Coleman ed., 1991) (discussing development of
Roman Catholic Church's claim of its "right and competence ... to address political, legal,
social and economic issues" in modem society). The work of John Courtney Murray, S.J.,
shaped the essential contours of American Catholic church-state theory. See JOHN C. MUR-
RAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960) (arguing that Catholicism is fully compatible with
democracy, especially given its natural law tradition); see also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE
CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS (1944) (advancing critical and yet
generally sympathetic Protestant account of democratic aspirations). In addition to his de-
fense of Catholicism as a legitimate partner in the American democratic experiment, Father
Murray's work as a political scientist and as a theologian is widely recognized as bearing its
greatest fruit in the recognition of religious liberty by the Second Vatican Council. See Decla-
ration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae), in VATICAN II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST
CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 800 (Austin Flannery ed., 1981).
5. A partial catalogue includes the moral and legal controversies surrounding religious
liberty, immigration, slavery, abolition, suffrage, prohibition, desegregation, economic justice
issues, nuclear war, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, and the death penalty.
See, e.g., DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., JUSTICE, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICAN
CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (1988); DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J.,
CLAIMS IN CONFLICT (1979) (both works presenting account of development of Roman Cath-
olic human rights theory and various approaches within that tradition for engaging in and
helping to resolve social-ethical controversies).
6. For examples of contemporary efforts of the Roman Catholic episcopacy in the United
States to express its judgment concerning important questions of social justice, see NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY (1986), and NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE
(1983).
7. The notion of religious authenticity I have in mind is not merely a sincerely held reli-
gious belief, which, although it may reveal a certain measure of moral integrity in an individ-
ual, renders meaningless the objective denotation of "religion" as such. What I mean by
religious authenticity is that which is recognized as such in a particular religious tradition, and
which is confirmed through its reception by a religiously plural political community.
8. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 46 (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1689) ("A Good Life, in which consists not the least part of
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public policy and law,9 and that both the rule of law and democratic
governance depend upon the moral and religious foundations of ordered
liberty."0 These were the presuppositions of the founders of this republic
and of the framers of the Bill of Rights, who, in the religion clauses of the
First Amendment,"1 gave constitutional form and preferential legal sta-
tus to religious liberty under the rule of law. 2
Notwithstanding the strength of this tradition, I found myself trou-
bled by what seems to be a rather serious impediment to its future effi-
cacy. While the form of the tradition remains visible and meaningful
exchanges still occur, 13 I believe that the potential contribution of the
dialogue between law and religion to democratic governance is
threatened because the conceptual foundations of the dialogue have been
undermined during the better part of this century. I will argue that an
estrangement has arisen between law and religion that impedes beneficial
Religion and true piety, concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety of Men's
Souls and of the Commonwealth").
9. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the depth of the republican respect for the political
function of religion. He wrote:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must
nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of [its] political institutions; for if it does not
impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions.... I do not know
whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion.... But I am certain that
they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON DEMOCRACY, REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY: SELECTED WRIT-
INGS 93 (John Stone & Stephen Mennell eds., 1980).
10. Even the Virginia Declaration of Rights, noted for its revolutionary commitment to
the principle of disestablishment and to religious liberty, recognized the necessary dependence
of democratic governance upon moral and religious virtue. In pertinent part, the document
reads:
Section 15. That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to
any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.
Section 16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to prac-
tice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.
JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY 191-92 (1991).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 3-103 (1964) (detailing formative influence of religion on founders); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 426-29 (1969) (noting importance of
religion to republican theory).
13. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babaluaye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993)
(considering testimony of religious anthropologists and theologians to establish religious func-
tion of animal sacrifice, which had been prohibited by series of municipal ordinances); Influ-
encing Legislation by Public Charities: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-90 (1976) (receiving testimony from religious organizations).
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interdisciplinary exchange and seriously threatens the rule of law and
democratic governance.
14
In its starkest form, this estrangement manifests itself in the virtual
banishment of religious belief and practice from the public life of the
political community. I have in mind not simply the Establishment
Clause"5 controversies regarding church-state relations or those concern-
ing religious liberty. To be sure, some of those disputes, as I argue later,
reject the versatile and religiously plural constitutional form of the 1791
church-state settlement. That constitutional approach to religion held
religious liberty in high regard, permitted a wide variety of reasonable
accommodations of religious life, and guided federal and state govern-
ment from the founding of the nation until the middle of this century.I6
What I have in mind is a more troubling source of alienation-an antire-
ligious bias that is deeply wary of religion and that tends to tolerate, if
not advocate, its public marginalization. 17
This negative disposition toward the presence of religion in civic life
and toward an active role for religious associations in the formation of
public policy seems to be rather widespread among intellectuals, media
elites, and law school faculties. Given their power and influence in
American culture, this antireligious bias has been widely disseminated
and has had a deep-if subtle-influence upon the general public's un-
derstanding of the role of religion in our democracy and especially upon
its place in public discourse. This bias also has been periodically ex-
pressed in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court such that its
attitude toward religion and reasonable church-state relations has all too
14. Every weakness in the foundation of the dialogue between law and religion regarding
controverted matters will likely be manifested in recurring public controversies and will un-
doubtedly make the resolution of such matters much more difficult. Current disputes regard-
ing abortion, sex education in public schools, and homosexuality are illustrative. See infra
parts II-IL.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
16. See infra part V.
17. In commenting upon the "secularization" of modern society, Professor Charles Taylor
has noted:
[The term] describes a process which is undeniable: the regression of belief in God,
and even more, the decline in the practice of religion, to the point where from being
central to whole life of Western societies, public and private, [belief in God and the
practice of religion] has become sub-cultural, one of the many private forms of in-
volvement which some people indulge in.
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 309 (1989); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE
INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 46 (1974) (noting modem disillusionment with law
and religion and urging commitment to renewal of "these two dialectically interdependent
dimensions . . . of the social life of man"); RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC
SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 20-37 (1984) (observing exclusion of reli-
gion from public discourse).
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often been one of deep distrust and studied indifference-if not antipa-
thy. Even more troubling is the Court's extreme disregard for the consti-
tutional dignity of religious beliefs and practices."8
Although a comprehensive investigation of this problem is beyond
the scope of the Article, I will examine what appear to be the principal
causes, signs, and primary consequences of this estrangement. In doing
so, I will give special attention to how this alienation bears upon the rule
of law generally, and more particularly upon public deliberation and de-
cision making concerning controverted moral issues. While the disaffec-
tion is quite deep, the breach may be repaired. However, in the absence
of this much needed rapprochement, there is little hope of a flourishing
academic or political exchange between these two aspects of civil society.
Accordingly, I will make several modest suggestions regarding how law
and religion might be reconciled and will identify those areas of interdis-
ciplinary cooperation which even now seem to offer the most promise.
II. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE ESTRANGEMENT
4. An Intellectual Bias Against All Things Religious
In American universities and law schools, it is not difficult to dis-
cover a palpable distrust of, and sometimes deep-seated animosity to-
ward, religious belief and practice.19 Professor Kent Greenawalt has
identified and described this animus quite candidly: "A good many
professors and other intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indiffer-
ence to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for the belief
in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary
human experience."20 This antireligious prejudice, which print and elec-
18. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115 (1992). Having criticized the Court's past hostility or indifference toward religion and the
recent turn of the Rehnquist Court toward religious majoritarianism as equally misguided,
Professor McConnell argues for a "regime of religious pluralism, as distinguished from both
majoritarianism and secularism." Id. at 117; see infra part V.
19. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 215 (1987) (describing
negative Enlightenment view in higher education toward religion as based upon "scientific
contempt in universities for the uncleanness of religion" because "religion vs. science was
equal to prejudice vs. truth"); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES
AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 13 (1991) (noting "characteristic liberal incapacity to
understand religion"); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029,
1031 (1990). Kronman notes that "Religion... whether it be quietly pietistic or mystical in
character, at some point always demands an 'intellectual sacrifice' that is incompatible with the
uncompromising rationalism of philosophy." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Max Weber, Sci-
ence as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 129, 155 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds., 1946)).
20. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988).
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tronic media elites share and frequently manifest, 21 originates in the
more skeptical strands of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.22 In
some respects it culminates in a Nietzchean disdain for organized reli-
gion and especially for Christianity.23 This bias was clearly present
among intellectuals who, describing themselves in the mid-1930s as "reli-
gious humanists,1 24 explicitly denied the supernatural or transcendental
horizon of traditional religions and sought to recast the social function of
such religions.25 While the work of John Dewey is representative of the
antireligious stance of some American academics during this period,26
21. See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 15-25 (1990)
(noting discontent with and general disregard for religion exhibited by members of national
media).
22. See DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION (Richard H.
Popkin ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980).
23. Contempt for religion, which openly reveals itself only rarely, draws from a range of
philosophical traditions but finds especially congenial the nihilism of Frederick Nietzsche. See
FREDERICK NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & trans., Viking Press 1954) (Circa. 1890) (announcing death of God and all
religions because religious belief in God is no longer possible and declaring necessary collapse
of all transcendental horizons because all such structures are mere human constructs).
24. This term was the self-description used by intellectuals like John Dewey who signed
the Humanist Manifesto I in 1933. HUMANIST MANIFESTOS I AND II, at 7 (Paul Kurtz ed.,
Prometheus Books 1984) (1933).
25. The propositional beliefs disclosed in Humanist Manifesto I, see id., illustrate a perva-
sive antireligious bias. Having defined "religion" as the "quest for abiding values [and] an
inseparable feature of human life," these reformers were convinced that "the time has passed
for theism, deism, [and] modernism," id. at 7, and therefore concluded that, "[t]he distinction
between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained" and that "religious institu-
tions, their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and communal activities must be reconsti-
tuted as rapidly as experience allows, in order to function effectively in the modern world," id.
at 8-10 (emphasis added).
Forty years later, the signers of Humanist Manifesto II affirmed the rejection of "tradi-
tional theism, especially in the prayer-hearing God, assumed to love and care for persons, to
hear and understand their prayers and to be able to do something about them [as] an unproved
and outmoded faith." Id. at 13. As the successor of "the old religions," humanism embraced
a universal naturalism, proclaimed its faith in human progress, and revealed "a set of common
principles that can serve as a basis for united action" and that provide "a design for a secular
society on a planetary scale." Id. at 13-15.
26. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934). As religion had "little knowledge
and no secure method of knowing," Dewey revealed his opinion of religion when he asked:
"How could the course of religion in its entire sweep not be marked by practices that are
shameful in their cruelty and lustfulness, and by beliefs that are degraded and intellectually
incredible?" Id. at 5-6. Proclaiming the liberation of modem intellectuals from the distortions
of supernatural religion, Dewey declared that:
[n]othing less than a revolution in "the seat of intellectual authority" has taken place
.... The mind of man is being habituated to a new method and ideal: There is but
one sure road of access to truth-the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating
by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection.
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today strands of the prejudice still emanate in varying degrees from the
works of prominent intellectuals.27
The conceptual foundations of this bias range from the complete
metaphysical denial of spiritual reality, usually accompanied by atheist
and materialist philosophies,2" to interpretations of rationalism expressed
in logical positivism29 and psychological determinism. 30 In no small
measure this antipathy toward religion, especially in its most diffuse
forms, developed in response to bruising confrontations with religions
like Calvinism and Roman Catholicism, which at times stifled intellec-
tual inquiry and freedom of conscience, and which sought to dominate
both the formation of public law and the coercive powers of the modem
nation state for religious purposes. Equally important is the protracted
history of encounters with anti-intellectual evangelical sects whose mem-
bers hold faith and reason in bitter opposition and who occasionally initi-
Id. at 32-33. See also EDWARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIEN-
TIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973) for a critical examination of the ten-
dency of some liberals to exclude religious discourse from public debate and decision making.
27. See Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Philosophy, in AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR
TRANSFORMATION? 26 (Kenneth Baynes et al. eds., 1993). Rorty notes that the Enlighten-
ment rightly concluded that "when religious intuitions were weeded out from among the intel-
lectually respectable candidates for Philosophical articulation[,] . . . what would succeed
religion would be better." Id at 55; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 368 (1980) (asserting liberal skepticism and denying knowledge of transcen-
dental meaning); Quentin Skinner, Who are 'We, 'Ambiguities of the Modern Self, 34 INQUIRY
133, 147-50 (1991) (reviewing Charles Taylor's book Sources of the Self and attacking Taylor's
theism).
28. See generally MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, AT THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ATHEISM (1987)
(detailing philosophical foundations of modem atheism).
29. The moral philosopher A.J. Ayer put the matter in rather stark terms when he de-
clared that the beliefs of the theist "cannot possibly be valid, but they cannot be invalid either.
As he says nothing at all about the world, he cannot justly be accused of saying anything false,
or anything for which he has insufficient grounds." A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND
LOGIC 116 (1952).
30. The works of Sigmund Freud, for example, reveal a highly critical account of the
phenomenon of religious experience. See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in
THE MAJOR WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 776 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds. & Joan Reviere
trans., 1952) (describing religion as contrived means of avoiding neurosis achieved at high cost
of submitting to "the forcible imposition of mental infantilism and [to the] induc[tion] of a
mass-delusion .... ."). The contempt for religion is unambiguous in psychologist George Vet-
ter's work, Magic and Religion. There he writes that "[o]ne glance at any of the current
anthropomorphic deities is sufficient to demonstrate to all but those hopelessly indoctrinated
during their helpless infancy, that these gods were created by man when he was not too well
informed." GEORGE VETTER, MAGIC AND RELIGION 509 (1958). Regarding the value of
religious-ethical insight to the formation of public policy, one can readily conclude Vetter's
view from his assertion that "[t]he reason that organized religions have been almost completely
impotent in providing intelligent and effective moral leadership is simply that they have had
none to give." Id. at 520; see also DAVID M. WULFF, PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION (1991).
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ate vigorous theocratic campaigns.3 1 Furthermore, the influence of legal
positivism and its principal thesis-that the concept of law is not depen-
dent upon any particular moral theory, conception of good, or theory of
justice32-- in combination with various forms of moral relativism,33 gives
aid and comfort to the antireligionist account of law.
In this Article, I will refer to those who share this animating preju-
dice as "Enlightenment or liberal fundamentalists." While this term suf-
fers all the defects of any stylized construct, I employ it as a general term
to describe the tendency of a certain strand of liberal thought to oppose
the nontheocratic presence of religion in the political life of the commu-
nity.34 This designation is not meant as an ad hominem against classical
or modem liberalism or against any particular person. Rather, the term
is intended to describe that variant of liberalism that reveals, with vary-
ing degrees of intensity,3" an antireligious "stance" or "disposition."
31. In this respect one might fairly say that this secular bias is a reaction to these battles
with ecclesiological and biblical fundamentalism. In criticizing the "religious right," Richard
Neuhaus has observed:
A dilemma, both political and theological, facing the religious new right is simply
this: it wants to enter the political arena making public claims on the basis of private
truth. The integrity of politics itself requires that such a proposal be resisted. Public
decisions must be made by arguments that are public in character .... It is not
derived from sources of revelation or disposition that are essentially private and arbi-
trary. The perplexity of fundamentalism in public is that its self-understanding is
premised upon a view of religion that is emphatically not public in character.
NEUHAUS, supra note 17, at 36. Accordingly, by insisting upon this separation of religious
conviction and public reason, Neuhaus correctly noted that "fundamentalist religion ratifies
and reinforces the conclusions of militant secularism." Id. at 37.
32. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (I. Berlin et al.
eds., Noonday Press 1954) (1832); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (explaining his account of independence of law from
moral foundations). But see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Profes-
sor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 644-48 (1958) (criticizing Hart for failing to account for
"internal morality of law," which is essential to concept of law in first instance).
33. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983) (detailing origins of ethical relativism and epistemologi-
cal skepticism and offering solutions for modem crisis regarding limits of knowledge); PERRY,
supra note 1, at 38-54 (distinguishing and critiquing various forms of moral and epistemologi-
cal relativism).
34. As is the case with virtually all contemporary Catholic intellectuals, I oppose theoc-
racy on moral, theological, and constitutional grounds. However, I believe that religious lib-
erty fully justifies the political action of religious organizations and the admissibility of
religious-ethical argumentation in public debate for the purposes of increased mutual under-
standing and personal deliberation. See infra part II.C.
35. See ACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 11 (requiring neutral dialogue in liberal state such
that "no reason is a good reason [admissible in public discourse] if it requires [the assertion]
•.. that [a citizen's] conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow
citizens"); Stephen Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 POL. THEORY 280, 281 (1990)
(arguing against legitimacy of certain forms of religious argumentation in public discourse).
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While this stance may not be cast as a full position, it may readily be
discerned as an "undercurrent" in the treatment of religion in a variety
of disciplines, including law.36 Furthermore, I do not mean to denigrate
the otherwise admirable work of those scholars who exhibit the bias. My
purpose here is to bring to the surface an antireligious mood and preju-
dice, which is elusive because it is illiberal to be intolerant, and which
inhibits the meaningful participation of "religious" intellectuals in the
academy and in the formation of public law.37
According to this fundamentalist account, religious belief tends to
be viewed, if not ridiculed, as anachronistic. 38  In its more extreme forms,
traditional religions such as Christianity and Judaism are thought to be
essentially unintelligible either because their transcendentalism is wholly
36. I do not mean to imply that the opposition of liberals to the presence of religion in
public life is always rooted in an antireligious bias. Clearly that is not the case. There are
classical liberals and many modems, for example, who were and are deeply religious men and
women or who were and are sincere religious agnostics. Such persons are not antireligious
even when they oppose an active political or governmental presence of religion. For example,
some liberals are convinced that it is extremely unwise for any religious tradition to attempt to
shape the moral content of the law and public policy regarding controverted matters in a
nation that is increasingly heterogenous with regard to religious and moral beliefs. Thus, to
preserve the public peace, modem liberals would argue that religious factionalism should be
avoided whenever possible. To that end, the better governmental policy will minimize sub-
stantive alliances between church and state on controverted matters, avoid even the appear-
ance of an endorsement of a religious stance, and resist any concerted attempt by religious
factions to achieve a deeper correlation between their moral/religious codes and public law. In
addition, to minimize the occasion of such conflict, one of the most important lessons for
citizens to learn is that religion is a private matter which, in the interest of public peace,
mutual respect, and civility, should remain a private matter. See Robert Audi, The Separation
of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259, 274-77
(1989) (suggesting churches should voluntarily adopt "an institutional principle of political
neutrality" because "[the] protection of religious liberty and [the maintenance] of governmen-
tal neutrality toward religious institutions is [thereby] better served"). While I disagree with
this rationale for the exclusion of religious faith and praxis from the political and governmen-
tal spheres, I want to make clear that my use of the term "Enlightenment fundamentalism"
does not include that line of argument, except insofar as it masks an antireligious bigotry.
37. In the context of public philosophy, some of those who have embraced this prejudice
to a greater degree would deny that religious belief and religious-ethical discourse have much
bearing, if any, upon rational public discussion, debate, and deliberation concerning public
affairs, and therefore no place in law. The conclusion of Jerome Frank concerning the proper
relation of religion to law is sympathetic with and representative of this view: "[A]s men have
learned to separate religion and science, leaving the latter to its own devices, so they must learn
not to let religion interfere with law .... ." JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
198 (1935).
38. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby,
1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 978 (arguing liberal neutrality toward religion, which claims to be neces-
sary to protect religion as cherished form of private conscience, has actual effect of "derogating
religious belief in favor of other more 'rational' methods of understanding" and consequently
puts religious belief at risk of becoming "a kind of hobby: something so private that it is as
irrelevant to public life as the building of model airplanes").
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lacking in rational foundation or because the doctrinal claims of such
religions are not subject to empirical proof. In the first case, religion is
nonsense; in the second, religious belief is neither empirically verifiable
nor falsifiable. If religion is either nonsense or unprovable, then it cannot
be a credible source of knowledge. Consequently, having little or no
claim upon rational minds, religious beliefs should have little or no influ-
ence upon the development of public policy and law.39 A liberal funda-
mentalist would also conclude that religiously based or religious-ethical
argumentation should be precluded from public discourse on the same
grounds. As I demonstrate below, this antireligious animosity violates
the best insights of liberalism when it compels Enlightenment fundamen-
talists, even if rhetorically, to deny religious expression and religious-eth-
ical discourse in the public forum.
B. The Crisis in Knowledge
The intended result of the animating prejudice of liberal fundamen-
talism-to mute the religious voice in the public sphere-is made more
likely when, as appears to be the case today, antireligious prejudice draws
strength from the crisis in knowledge signified in the prevalence of episte-
mological skepticism and moral relativism in most academic settings.40
While most prominent liberals have not yielded to the skeptic's pessi-
mism,4 1 the liberal fundamentalist-as an ideal type-is more inclined to
do so.42 In the absence of an objective criterion to guide a comparative
judgment, no conception of the good has any greater validity than any
39. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
198 (1992) (advocating "establishment of the secular public moral order" given primacy of
liberalism over religious ideas in public sphere).
40. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 1-49. Bernstein correctly notes "the universalistic
and reductivistic claims made in the name of the sciences" such that "[e]very defender of
hermeneutics, and more generally the humanistic traditions, has had to confront the persistent
claim that science and science alone is the measure of reality, knowledge and truth." Id. at 46.
In no small measure this confrontation sublates the estrangement of law and religion as well as
the separation of law and morality.
41. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986); William Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 621 (1982);
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
42. This tendency may be partially understood by considering Professor Michael Sandel's
identification of the following different grounds for the neutrality of the state regarding com-
peting moral theories:
(1) [T]he relativist view says law should not affirm a particular moral conception
because all morality is relative, and so there are no moral truths to affirm; (2) the
utilitarian view that argues that government neutrality will, for various reasons, pro-
mote the general welfare in the long run; (3) the voluntarist view holds that govern-
ment should be neutral ... in order to respect the capacity of persons as free citizens
or autonomous agents to choose their conceptions for themselves; and (4) the mini-
malist, or pragmatic view says that, because people inevitably disagree about moral-
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other. For those thus disposed, the aggregate effect of this skepticism is
to render suspect almost any theory of the good, moral truth-claim, and
certainly any religious account of the good life. On this view, even mod-
est claims regarding an objective plurality of incommensurable, premoral
goods-such as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship,
and religion 43-are doubtful as "knowledge" of anything except one's
subjective preferences."
If epistemological skepticism yields such uncertainty in the founda-
tions and plausible content of rational ethics, it is hardly surprising that
the insights and judgments of religious traditions are similarly reduced to
mere opinion. The entire realm of religious knowledge and a large por-
tion of the moral sphere are thus privatized. While the effect of this sub-
jectivist "inward turn" upon public discourse is explored more fully
below, it is important to note that this "agnosticism of the good"-
caused at least by a belief in the incommensurability of differing concep-
tions of the good if not by varying degrees of epistemological skepti-
cism-has seriously weakened the rule of law.45 Moreover, if the
ity and religion, government should bracket these controversies for the sake of
political agreement and social cooperation.
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77
CAL. L. REV. 521, 522 (1989). As an ideal type, the liberal fundamentalist would seem to be
most disposed toward relativist or minimalist theories of state neutrality.
43. Professor John Finnis has identified these aspects of human experience as self-evident
"basic forms of human good" which shape the matrix of our experience of goodness in all its
countless variety. With respect to each category, Finnis provides as comprehensive a defini-
tion as possible and makes clear that these forms of the good are to be distinguished from that
which is "morally good." JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90
(1980); see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 433 (1980) (arguing that "liberty and oppor-
tunity, income and wealth, and above all self-respect are primary goods ... [which are] neces-
sary for the framing and the execution of a rational plan of life" (emphasis added)).
44. It may be helpful here to differentiate the epistemological doubt that is generally char-
acteristic of liberal philosophy from the modern praxis of liberals. Liberal skepticism would
lead most moderns to resist, as a matter of liberal doctrine, almost every metaethical defense of
any given conception of the good. However, as a matter of practical agreement and especially
regarding an accurate description of the contemporary moral horizon, most modern liberals
would very likely agree with Finnis and Rawls that certain basic goods do command nearly
universal acceptance. Nevertheless, the phenomenon I am describing as Enlightenment funda-
mentalism tends to exaggerate the epistemological controversy, especially when confronted
with religious belief and religious-ethical argument.
45. By "the rule of law" I do not simply mean to describe the rational ordering of society
by means of public law or the jurisprudential requirement of the stability of legal rules or even
the political and juridical institutions necessary for democratic governance. Certainly, the rule
of law in a democracy comprehends such concepts and instruments. See LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Neil MacCormick has summarized Fuller's account of the
essential feature of the rule of law:
For there to be law at all, there have to be rules of a reasonable degree of generality
and clarity; they must be published to the addressees and be prospective in effect;
there should be reasonable constancy in the rules over time, and they must set stan-
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substantive content of the law is not morally binding, even mainstream
liberal accounts of the justification of law are subject to charges of ideol-
ogy and arbitrariness. Unmasking such constructs is a strategic objective
shared by disparate legal reform movements in American law during the
twentieth century.46
Given the influence of subjectivism, epistemological doubt, and
moral relativism in the legal culture, and to an increasing degree in the
culture at large, it is no wonder that many courts, legislatures, and legal
commentators embrace a jurisprudence dominated by legal positivism
and by an almost doctrinal disposition toward moral agnosticism. 47
Consequently, a critical examination of the relation of morality to the
formation, execution, and revision of law is rarely the explicit focus of
legal education and even less so of public affairs discussions of controver-
sial matters. Not surprisingly, the relationship of religious belief and
practice to the development of moral agency is largely unexplored in
those modes of legal discourse as well.
I do not mean to imply that there is no discussion of moral issues in
legal education or in public debate. Obviously that is not the case. How-
ever, I believe that most of the discussion is largely descriptive-of the
fact of differing conceptions of the good life, of pluralism, of multicul-
turalism, and the like-and does not engage in a critical analysis of the
content of differing moral claims or their rational justification. This situ-
ation is understandable and tolerable only if one believes that no concep-
tion of the good is distinguishable from another in principle. However,
because I believe that I do know, and do not simply have an opinion, that
some conceptions of the good are false-for example, that racial
supremacy arguments are false-and that I can justify that conclusion
according to rationally defensible moral and religious premises, the ab-
dards with which it is possible to comply; and finally, given that there are rules which
have such characteristics in some reasonable balance, the conduct of legal officials
should be substantially congruent with the announced rules.
Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY 105, 122 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). What I have in mind is not simply this "inner
morality of law," id., but the more fundamental psychological and sociopolitical aspects of the
rule of law: the civic habit of mind and heart that is expressed in the virtue of law-observance,
and which depends almost entirely upon a genuine respect for the authoritative moral and
religious foundations of public law, see infra part III.B.
46. See, eg., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (discussing critical race
theory); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)
(offering feminist critique of law, politics, and sexuality); ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
& POLITICS (1975) (discussing critical legal studies).
47. But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1364-71 (1991) (rejecting notion that liberalism always requires
substantive neutrality toward all conceptions of good).
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sence of a more rigorous critical scrutiny of the moral issues of the day is
a disturbing trend. This is especially troubling in law schools where
those skilled in the art of controverted moral discourse ought to be
guided not only by principles of rhetoric and forensic debate but also by
sophisticated moral philosophy and by appeals to wisdom and good judg-
ment as well.48 For those of us who seek a communal life mediated by
the rule of law49 and a host of subsidiary structures based upon some-
thing more stable than subjectivism or naked power factionalism, this
aspect of legal education is very troubling. 0
C. Disregarding Liberal Premises
A third characteristic of liberal fundamentalism is its readiness to
push religion out of the public square and to privatize religious belief and
practice. 1 This inclination violates some of the best insights and core
principles of liberalism. Accordingly, several objections on liberal
grounds may be made to this apparent willingness to repudiate liberal
premises and to chill if not repress religious liberty in the public domain.
First, this hostility toward religious belief, practice, and religious-
ethical discourse violates one of the most important premises of classical
liberalism: that no conception of the good life is binding upon the con-
science of the individual. At the heart of the liberal position is the indi-
48. See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 18 (1991) (describing effect of
radical individualism, subjectivism, and relativism-epistemological and moral-as "ban-
ish[ing] discussions about the good life to the margins of political debate," which in turn has
caused "an extraordinary inarticulacy" concerning the "constitutive ideals of modern
culture").
49. For criticism of the failure of certain forms of liberalism to take seriously human soci-
ality, see Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Gov-
ernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986), and Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984). See also Paul W. Kahn, Community in Con-
temporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989) for an insightful account of communi-
tarian theories.
50. But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 685, 689 (1992) (reviewing various communitarian critiques of modern liberalism and
defending thesis that antiliberal attacks have had entirely positive result of forcing "both liber-
als and antiliberals ... [to] argue directly for the merits of their substantive moral visions");
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (finding civic republicanism
congenial with modern liberal constitutionalism).
51. Secularization of our educational institutions is one of the more effective means of
privatizing religious belief. In most public schools religion is a "nonsubject," notwithstanding
its enormous influence in the development of Western culture. In addition, those who shape
public opinion through the electronic media often demonstrate a studied indifference to reli-
gion and very often a lightly cloaked contempt for religious values. With respect to the legal
culture, the principal means chosen are doubtful interpretations of the religion clauses and a
strict separationist public policy. See infra part IV.
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vidual's prerogative to resist the claims of every human authority and
even those of the church. 2 Each person is thus "the measure of all
things" 3 concerning the rational plan of one's life including one's moral
and religious beliefs. In its more radical individualist form, the only nor-
mative moral or religious values that bind liberal thought and action are
self-generated and self-authenticated. 4 That being the case, one would
think that religious belief would be respected as a liberally chosen good.
However, the converse is true. Liberal fundamentalism, contrary to lib-
eral dogma, asserts the lexical priority of its secular heuristic and claims
the authority to define the canonical grounds of public discourse in accord
with that secular criterion. On that account, reliance upon religious expe-
rience, insight, or religious-ethical knowledge is illegitimate for the pur-
poses of public discourse and decision making.5 This is an egregiously
illiberal act. It is decidedly unliberal to claim knowledge of a universal
normative criterion and decidedly antiliberal to attempt to claim the au-
thority to impose that standard on a free society. 6 On liberal grounds,
52. John Rawls has recently argued that the origin of liberal thought is rooted in the
Reformation, which, by "introducing into people's conceptions of their good a transcendent
element not admitting of compromise," made moral and religious pluralism a permanent fea-
ture of modem political society. RAwLS, supra note 41, at xxvi. Consequently, "[t]his ele-
ment forces either moral conflict moderated only by circumstance or exhaustion, or equal
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought." Id.
53. This proposition was defended by Protagoras in his dialogue with Socrates in advanc-
ing one of the earliest arguments defending skepticism and moral relativism. See PLATO, Pro-
tagoras, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1952).
54. The liberal account of the good was heavily influenced by Kantian epistemology and
Humean skepticism. See DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk III.i.I (Oxford,
Clarendon 1896) (arguing that moral distinctions cannot be derived from reason); IMMANUEL
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., MacMillan
1989) (1785); IMMANUEL KANT, A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meicklejohn trans.,
Great Books of the W. World 1952) (1781). While Kant's primary intention was to demon-
strate the existence and rationality of a universal, objective moral law, his rigorous critique of
the attempt to ground morality on experience and his emphasis upon the chasm between the Is
and the Ought worked an unintended result. As one commentator put it, although Kant's
purpose "was to show us that the only possible way of grounding the moral law" was in his
transcendental theory, his critics' attacks upon the categorical imperative had the lasting effect
of creating the "specter" of moral relativism in modem philosophy. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 33, at 14.
55. Traditional liberals allow recourse to such experiences and beliefs but only on the con-
dition that they are legitimate in the formation of private opinions. Although these opinions
are "prepublic," they may still guide the active participation of the religious citizen in public
debate and decision making. This public-private dichotomy is an essential element in the mod-
em liberal treatment of religion. Enlightcnment fundamentalism presses this distinction to its
logical extreme by denying that religious discourse has any relevance to "public reason."
56. A similar violation of liberalism's first principles may be found in the censorship of
speech reflected in the so-called hate-speech codes adopted recently by prominent universities.
This alarming assault upon freedom of thought and speech has been repeatedly denounced by
the press. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Spineless at Penn, WASH. POST, June 25, 1993, at
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no one has the power to declare that he or she knows the truth about
religious faith or about the legitimate grounds of public decision making.
By attempting to do so, the liberal fundamentalist apparently hopes to
marginalize if not completely suppress the exercise of religious liberty in
the political sphere.5 7
Second, implicit in this argument against religion in the public
square is the assumption that faith cannot be reconciled with reason.
That being the case, religious experience is alien to, as opposed to being
differentiated from, rational experience. Given the absence of its capac-
ity to contribute anything to public reason, religious faith and its ethical
canons must be considered an entirely private matter. Thus, on this ac-
count, even if the spiritual dimension of humanity is conceded, relig-
iously premised public discourse would still remain illegitimate for
liberal fundamentalists.
This line of argument violates liberal dogma in several important
respects. The relation of faith and reason is very much disputed as a
matter of theological doctrine.5 8 For certain Protestant evangelical sects,
the antinomy between faith and reason is a central doctrinal belief and is
often constitutive of their ecclesial identity; but for Roman Catholics and
Jews there is no such opposition. 9 Consequently, as the major premise
of this argument to exclude religious discourse from the public square is
A25 (denouncing Sheldon Hackney's defense of University of Pennsylvania's speech codes "as
increasing the freedom of expression for all" by removing chilling effect of offensive speech as
"Orwellian").
57. Given the ubiquity of religious faith in the United States, this strategy cannot possibly
succeed in its attempt to exile religion or to silence religious-ethical discourse. However, inso-
far as this bias against religion is pervasive in American educational institutions and is widely
disseminated through print and electronic mass communications, the alienation of law and
religion is likely to deepen.
58. While this dispute among Western Christians has complex origins and has not yet been
fully resolved, it will be sufficient for our purposes here to note that the issue turns upon the
effect of original sin upon human nature and upon the effect of grace upon humanity. Accord-
ing to Reform theologians, human nature, including rationality, is totally corrupt because of
original sin. Reason is therefore utterly useless as a means of gaining knowledge of the good.
The truth about God and knowledge of what is genuinely good is known only by those who are
saved by faith in Christ. Such knowledge is the exclusive province of faith, not reason.
The Catholic theory is very different. Although human nature was wounded by original
sin, we hold that human nature was not utterly destroyed. Having been made in the image and
likeness of God, each person has an essential dignity and an intrinsic goodness that accompa-
nies being "an act of God." Neither original sin nor the whole range of sinfulness of which
humanity is capable has destroyed the God-wardness of human nature or the God-wardness of
every individual human life. Knowledge of God and of moral goodness is thus available
through several sources: human reason, divine revelation, and the apostolic tradition.
59. For Roman Catholics and for most Jews, Faith and Reason are not enemies; both are
God-given, one by way of grace and one by way of created human nature. However, for many
Protestant Christian denominations, especially those who believe that human nature is totally
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
both a much-disputed theological issue and an essential doctrinal tenet of
some churches, the argument embraces at least two illiberal positions.
On the one hand, in assuming that faith and reason cannot be recon-
ciled, liberal fundamentalism has arrogated to itself not only the compe-
tency to resolve a theological controversy, but also the power to decide
the matter. Even the suggestion that it enjoys that capacity and author-
ity cannot be reconciled with the formal religious agnosticism of classical
liberalism. Moreover, by implication, it is also asserting the competency
and power of the state to do so as well. In this respect, another cardinal
principle of liberalism is disregarded: that the state is without power to
settle religious controversies because it is not competent to construe reli-
gious dogma.' On the other hand, by assuming the very ground in con-
troversy and by declaring, albeit implicitly, the antinomy between faith
and reason, liberal fundamentalism not only begs a question it cannot
answer but also thereby encourages the state to adopt a Protestant evan-
gelical doctrine even though its argument is cast as a secular thesis.
Thus, regardless of its intention, to the extent that the liberal state em-
braces the privatization of religion and the secular heuristic of Enlighten-
ment fundamentalism, it establishes a sectarian ecclesiology.6
Enlightenment fundamentalism thus repudiates the liberal recogni-
tion of the freedom of every religious community to be faithful to its self-
determined religious identity, which includes its doctrinal resolution of
the relation of faith and reason and its strategy for engaging or not en-
gaging in public affairs discourse. Furthermore, on liberal tolerance and
corrupt because of original sin, Christian faith and unregenerate reason are by doctrinal defini-
tion always in complete opposition.
60. See Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (reversing
Illinois Supreme Court decision that found church arbitrarily disregarded its own laws and
procedures, on grounds that inquiry violated First Amendment and "would undermine the
general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry");
Gonzales v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (noting that "[i]n the absence of fraud, collu-
sion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesias-
tical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before secular courts as
conclusive"). Similarly, see Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872), in which the
Court stated that
the rule of action which should govern the civil courts ... is, that, whenever the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been
decided by the highest.., church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
[courts] must accept such decisions as final and as binding upon them, in their appli-
cation to the case before them.
61. The admission of the Catholic-Jewish thesis in the public sphere along with the Protes-
tant Reform thesis and the religious-moral skepticism of Enlightenment fundamentalism
would not establish the Catholic-Jewish thesis over its opponents. To the contrary, it would
simply achieve a liberal state of affairs: free and open discussion, debate, and deliberation
about public policy and law.
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free exercise grounds, those religious traditions that hold reason and faith
in a positive dialectic should not be required to discard that doctrinal
belief in exchange for full political equality in public discourse.62
Finally, if religious thought and argument are wholly without ra-
tional foundation or intellectual appeal, as Enlightenment fundamental-
ists contend, then public scrutiny will make its rational deficiencies
abundantly clear. On long-standing liberal premises, the state should not
attempt to resolve the much disputed theological and philosophical ques-
tion concerning the relation of faith and reason. Furthermore, instead of
confronting religious argument in the marketplace of ideas with the arse-
nal of reason, the liberal fundamentalist apparently would have the state
act as a censor of public discourse through a kind of prior restraint on
religious speakers. In this respect, the antireligious bias again renders
such persons blind to the contradiction of the most admirable character-
istic of the liberal tradition: the vigorous defense of freedom of thought
and discourse.
III. GIVING FORM TO THE ESTRANGEMENT
It requires no argument to demonstrate that substantive moral disa-
greement exists regarding competing public policies restraining or per-
mitting abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, and pornography, as
well as on larger questions of racial justice, the role of women in society,
and the distribution of wealth and power. Considering the moral and
religious pluralism that characterizes our republic, the resolution of such
controversies is exceedingly problematic. Accordingly, we must depend
upon various democratic concepts and procedures to establish political if
not moral consensus, while preserving individual liberty and constraining
62. The characterization of "religious activists" by the mass media as "fundamentalists,"
"right-wing Christians" or "religious extremists" is an attempt to reinforce the liberal funda-
mentalist stereotype of religion as "nonrational" and to propagate the notion that faith and
reason cannot be reconciled and that religion is idiosyncratic. While it is true that the moral
dimensions of issues like abortion and homosexuality tend to be opposed by biblical fundamen-
talists solely on the grounds of biblical revelation, Roman Catholic teaching on such matters is
not so constrained. Appeals to reason, to the data of science and to evidences drawn from
human moral experience all figure prominently in Catholic religious-ethical moral teaching. I
believe the same to be true of the Anglican and Lutheran traditions as well. Moreover, when
Christian churches question the legitimacy of capital punishment, argue against the use of
nuclear armaments, or advocate racial justice, they are not described by the media as "reli-
gious fanatics." Nevertheless, the mass media continue to paint "the extremist Religion" mon-
tage with a very broad brush. One can only wonder why gross generalizations about "religious
people"-primarily Christians and Muslims-go unchallenged when even the slightest concep-
tual distortion regarding people of color, women, and Jews are vigorously, and rightly,
denounced.
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governmental power. 3 Among these devices liberalism has embraced
the practice of privatizing certain moral controversies, which has had a
direct and adverse impact upon the participation of religion in public life.
Here I will argue that this practice has caused the marginalization of
religion in society and has thereby played a significant role in the es-
trangement of law and religion.' 4
A. The Principle of Preclusion
The liberal practice of privatizing moral controversy is premised
upon the classical liberal doctrine that government must be neutral to-
ward competing conceptions of the good 65 because there is no principled
basis upon which we can resolve moral or religious-ethical conflicts. 6
Accordingly, the only sensible public strategy is to "preclude state action
on the issue, and leave each citizen free to act on the basis of his or her
own morality (to the extent possible without state action)."67 On this
view, the characteristic liberal resolution of some controverted moral is-
sues has been to employ "principles of preclusion, which serve the more
familiar purpose of determining which policies... [are] legitimate sub-
ject[s] for legislation. These principles preclude fundamental moral con-
flict by denying certain reasons moral standing in the policy-making
63. To achieve public peace and civil order, liberal democracies generally rely upon major-
ity rule, judicial deference to legislative choices-subject to substantive and yet malleable no-
tions of due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights-governmental neutrality
toward most conceptions of the good and especially those advanced by religion, the privatiza-
tion of certain moral issues, and the development of the intellectual virtues of open-mindedness
and tolerance.
64. Government neutrality toward competing conceptions of the good is a presupposition
of the liberal technique of removing certain controverted issues from public deliberation and
legislative decision making. That sense of neutrality is related to-but should be distinguished
from-the neutrality required of government by the Establishment Clause. See infra part V
for a discussion of that aspect of neutrality.
65. See Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339 (1990) (presenting
insightful account of liberal justification of state neutrality as commitment to substantive
moral principle); Sandel, supra note 42, at 522 (defending thesis that "[t]he cure for liberalism
is not majoritarianism, but a keener appreciation of the role of substantive moral discourse in
political and constitutional argument").
66. Although religious ethics and exclusively rational morality often focus on similar ob-
jects, as in the duty not to kill or the obligation to speak the truth, these forms of discourse are
not identical. They are distinguishable in the source and nature of obligation and in the kind
of circumstances that give rise to ethical considerations. Scriptural warrants, religious custom,
the notions of sin and forgiveness, public and private revelation, and the like are elements that
distinguish religious-ethical discourse from rational ethics.
67. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, in LIB-
ERALISM AND THE GOOD 121, 125 (R. Bruce Douglas et al. eds., 1990).
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process."6 Although liberals apply such principles differently,69 liberal
theory inevitably privatizes certain moral controversies by excluding
some matters from legislative or judicial resolution. This "issue-preclu-
sion" thesis is at the heart of the negative liberties claimed under the
substantive due process "right to privacy" cases. Accordingly, decisions
concerning reproductive liberty,70 the refusal of medical treatment,7" and
consensual adult sexual relations72 are presented as essentially private
matters over which the state has minimal jurisdiction. In addition, given
either its skepticism or its agnosticism toward religious truth, this ac-
count of liberalism requires the liberal state to remain neutral toward
such matters and further prohibits almost all state action regarding reli-
gion.73 Thus, as religious claims are not capable of rational settlement,
those issues are almost entirely matters of private belief.
68. Id (emphasis added).
69. For example, Professors Gutmann and Thompson are critical of the scope of the issues
removed from the political agenda by the more skeptical strands of liberalism and the general
requirement that the state must always remain neutral both toward religion and between reli-
gion and irreligion. On that account, religious argument is generally excluded from public
discourse, and the state is required to abstain from all but a very few religious claims.
In contrast, recovering a Lockean account of religious tolerance, the authors would per-
mit much more interaction than "traditional" liberals. Those religions, for example, that "ac-
cept the voluntary nature of faith," and which would not seek to coerce religious belief
through law would be allowed to participate fully in public discourse and rational deliberation.
Id. at 128. Following such deliberations, the state would not be prohibited from acting in
accord even with religious positions; for example, prohibiting racism, restricting abortion, and
advancing poverty programs would be permitted state actions even though they are consonant
with the religious-ethical positions of various religions.
70. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that elective abortion is entirely private
decision in first trimester of pregnancy); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(holding that individual's right to privacy encompassed use of contraceptives); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married couple's right to privacy encompassed
use of contraceptives).
71. See Cruzan v. Director of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (assuming but not
deciding right of mentally competent adult to refuse medical treatment included within mean-
ing of liberty and privacy).
72. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting petitioner's argument that
right to privacy protects consensual adult homosexual sodomy).
73. This solution is necessary regarding doctrinal disputes because the state is not compe-
tent to make such judgments. As previously noted, no legislature or court is competent to
resolve the disagreement between Roman Catholic and reform theologians regarding the effect
of original sin upon human nature. This incapacity is premised upon the principle that the
state does not have the power to compel belief because faith is voluntary and a matter of free
conscience. However, there is a difference between a neutrality that forbids state mediation of
ecclesiastical disputes or state coercion of religious belief and one that requires a broad exclu-
sion of religion from the public square. In the former case, the state is incompetent to judge
the matter and without power to demand assent. In the latter case, the rationale for the pre-
clusion of religious discourse is itself a disputed matter.
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B. The Problem with Preclusion
While this aspect of classical liberalism undoubtedly appeals to
moral and religious agnostics, and most certainly to Enlightenment fun-
damentalists, the privatization of moral controversy is nevertheless seri-
ously flawed for three important reasons. First, those who would
categorically exclude religious discourse from the public square fail to
distinguish the multiple functions of such discourse in relation to "public
reason" and lawmaking.74 One function, and perhaps the most contro-
versial, occurs when the operative public reason for enacting a law is
explicitly religious, as was the case during colonial establishment and
even after the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights when
a variety of religious practices and moral codes were codified and en-
forced by coercive state sanctions.75 Another function of religious dis-
course is to increase mutual understanding among all citizens regarding
the religious-ethical perspectives of religious citizens. A final purpose is
the relevance of religious discourse among citizen-believers engaged in
personal and associational deliberation concerning public decision mak-
ing. Such exchanges among believers within the same religious tradition,
followers of other religious faiths, agnostics, and atheists are undeniably
relevant to the democratic decision-making process.
Convinced of the irrationality of religious belief, a liberal fundamen-
talist might object to each of these categories.76 Given the liberal dogma
that political choices must be based upon publicly accessible reasons,
some liberals would exclude all religious argument from the domain of
public choice since by hypothesis religious convictions are based upon
premises that are not generally shared. However, that objection can be
levelled against all conceptions of the good life, which, also by hypothe-
74. For a thoughtful discussion of this relation, see Macedo, supra note 35, at 280;
GREENAWALT, supra note 20; and MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER (1991).
75. See AMERICAN STATE PAPERS (William A. Blakely ed., 1943). For example, in 1610
the Virginia colony enforced the death penalty for speaking "impiously or maliciously, against
the holy and blessed Trinity ... or against the known articles of the Christian faith." Id. at 18.
Virginia also enforced church attendance, required baptism of all children, and prohibited
travel on Sunday upon pain of substantial fines. Id. at 18-20. Similarly, the Massachusetts
colony had laws that imposed the death penalty for the repeated denial of the infallibility of the
King James version of the Bible. Id. at 26. Catholic priests and Jesuits in particular were
banished from the colony in 1647 and, except in cases of shipwreck, were to be executed if
found within the colony. Id. at 31.
76. I have especially in mind those intellectuals who are either atheists or radical agnostics
and perhaps even those who are members of minority religious communities who fear the
alliance of majoritarian religion with majoritarian legislative power. As I show infra part V,
the problem of religious-legislative tyranny is better met by a vigorous public religious plural-
ism and not by the privatization of religion.
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sis, are exceedingly plural in character and often essentially incompati-
ble.77 While it is clear that given the range of competing conceptions of
the good, what ought to constitute "a legitimate public reason" presents
a difficult definitional problem. It is also clear that an a priori exclusion
of religious argumentation cannot be justified simply on the grounds of
protecting the integrity of public discourse from "premises not generally
shared" or from "controversial issues."7" This mistake is most apparent
when religious discourse is designed to increase mutual understanding
and reflective decision making.79 Furthermore, as religious liberty com-
mands a privileged constitutional status, that liberty includes the citi-
zen's prerogative to act for express religious purposes, conditioned only
by the constitutional principle of nonestablishment. Thus, religious ar-
gument directed toward any public issue ought to be admissible in public
discourse as well. That is especially the case with the debate about rea-
sonable church-state accommodations. The failure to distinguish appro-
priate from arguably inappropriate uses of religious argument relative to
public deliberation seriously undermines the credibility of certain strands
of liberalism and, with respect to Enlightenment fundamentalism, illus-
trates just how far off the mark that variant is in its approach to religion.
Second, the principle of preclusion on the basis of controversy alone
is selectively applied and indeterminant. Although racism, sexism, and
more recently, heterosexism are surely controverted moral issues, liberals
77. John Rawls has put the matter thus: "Now the serious problem is this. A modem
democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, phil-
osophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally." RAwLS, supra
note 41, at xvi. The task of political theory is to construct a society that can respond to "the
fact of reasonable pluralism," which is "the normal result of the exercise of human reason
within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime." Id. at
xvi-xvii.
78. In criticizing Kent Greenawalt's general exclusion of religious argument, Michael
Perry makes a similar point in asking the following question:
Why should one person be asked to forgo "public advocacy" of her position on the
ground that her advocacy would appeal to controversial religious premises about
human good, when another person is invited to engage in public advocacy of his
position because his advocacy appeals merely to controversial secular premises about
human good?
PERRY, supra note 74, at 20 (emphasis added).
79. Professor Greenawalt has admitted the difficulty, especially when the exclusion rule is
sometimes construed to grant legitimacy to "personal perception, intuitions, feelings, commit-
ments and deference to the judgments of others" but to deny legitimacy to religious convic-
tions even in making political choices. In most circumstances this would indicate nothing
more than a naked hostility to religion: "Unless a society was actually hostile to religion or
riven by religious strife, how could it be thought preferable for people to rely on nonreligious
personal judgments rather than upon religious convictions?" GREENAWALT, supra note 20, at
156-57.
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would be hard-pressed to explain why those categories are not precluded
from public debate and coercive legislation while controversies over the
legal protection of human life,80 the regulation of human sexuality, and
the nature of marriage"1 are frequently said to be matters of "private
choice." 2 Just as it is not clear why some but not all disputed matters
remain subject to public decision and regulation, it is also not clear just
how much controversy is required to remove an issue from the political
agenda. For example, at what point, if ever, would the civil disobedience
of citizens protesting against the prohibition of physician-assisted suicide
render euthanasia a matter of private choice? Furthermore, the justifica-
tion for the principle of preclusion is not at all apparent. Rational dis-
sent alone does not require the community to retreat from moral
deliberation unless one accepts as "truth" the circular conclusion that
there is no principled ground for deciding the issue ipse dixit. Further-
more, this feature of neutrality-that the state must remain indifferent to
any conception of the good-renders liberalism open to the charge of
moral vacuity. 3 In addition, while religious-ethical argumentation may
80. For a critical review of the privacy arguments advanced with respect to the act of
abortion, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE (1979). Privacy arguments, ex-
pressed in the form of a special negative freedom-such as the notion that individual liberty
regarding certain matters ought to be free from substantive government intrusion-have been
advanced in a number of extremely controversial settings. For example, it has been argued
that the concept of privacy includes the right to destroy at will frozen human embryos, to
participate in fetal tissue research, to engage in the sale of human organs, to contract for
surrogate motherhood, to procure an abortion even for purposes of sex-selection, to refuse food
and hydration during surrogate motherhood and hence, to choose death for unconscious per-
sons in certain circumstances, and to elect and participate in euthanasia. Insofar as such issues
are contemporary moral problems, they raise substantive anthropological issues in the sense
that differing conceptions of the human person are often in conflict in such settings. Although
those conflicts are not necessarily compelled by liberal thought, they certainly cannot be recon-
ciled by liberalism in the absence of a consensual anthropology, which guides public and pri-
vate decision making.
81. The increasingly confrontational gay rights movement is attempting to gain full public
acceptance and legalization of homosexuality under the rubric of private choice in matters of
consensual adult sexuality, while simultaneously demanding public antidiscrimination laws be
amended to include sexual orientation. The United States Supreme Court frustrated this strat-
egy in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding right to engage in consensual homo-
sexual sodomy not protected by any notion of substantive due process).
82. The claim I make here presumes that in this "age of epistemological doubt," in which
polemical factions having rationally irreconcilable moral positions are increasing in number,
there no longer exists a substantive and commonly accepted "ideal anthropology" according to
which "public wrongs" may be identified and adjudicated. In addition, because of the effect of
skepticism, ideas-such as Immanuel Kant's principle of universalizability or John Stuart
Mill's duty to do no harm principle-are not readily available to establish customary norms or
to "adjudicate" transgressions against such rules rooted in a common anthropology.
83. See Gardbaum, supra note 50 (challenging assumptions that have lead liberalism to
cede this ground to antiliberal critics).
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be unpersuasive for some traditional liberals for a variety of reasons-for
example, the interest of public peace and religious harmony-and for all
liberal fundamentalists because of its putative absence of empirical foun-
dation or rational appeal, the preclusion rationale as applied to that class
of argumentation is "not proven." The preclusion rationale knowingly
begs the ground of its conclusion that religion cannot advance a legiti-
mate public reason. Regrettably, this aspect of liberalism seems to have
mistaken circularity and a heckler's veto for rational arguments. Ac-
cordingly, the decision to deny religious-ethical discourse "moral stand-
ing in the policy-making process"84 is simply not justified.
Third, and of great importance, the privatization of rationally con-
troverted moral conflict robs the political community of the opportunity
to become schooled in and skilled at public moral reasoning, delibera-
tion, and decision making. The communal process of recognizing moral
issues, defining the meaning and significance of ordinary moral language,
refining that meaning through concrete application, creating and justify-
ing appropriate exceptions, and confronting and resolving new difficulties
for which moral precedent is either inadequate or inapplicable because
prior cases did not face a distinguishing element in the present case are
denied publicity when moral controversy is privatized.
Admittedly, this process is most effective within a culture that
shares a common ideal regarding conceptions of human personhood and
a largely homogeneous moral tradition. Because those foundations have
been seriously eroded if not balkanized in our culture, the social and
political consequences of this lack of cohesion are extremely worrisome.
Nevertheless, every democratic political community presumes and ex-
presses some minimal moral unity, even if lightly tethered, and accord-
ingly must act to preserve that unity. To that end, its citizens must have
the capacity to engage in public discourse to resolve civic controversies
that refine or modify that political-moral self-understanding. In a heter-
odox polity such as ours, that discursive and decisional faculty is impera-
tive unless one is willing to accept widespread descensus and civil unrest.
In addition to closing this free school of public moral philosophy,
the repression of religious argumentation on ideological grounds renders
the process of deliberation less credible and deprives the rule of deci-
sion-that by hypothesis will be controversial to the losing factions-of
at least two important benefits. On the one hand, the exclusion of reli-
gious argument diminishes the community's opportunity to achieve at
least a broader understanding of the disputed matter, if not a consensus.
84. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 67, at 125.
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On the other hand, the acceptance of an adverse decision by an excluded
faction is made more difficult by the denial of full participation rights,
even if only rhetorical, and an opportunity for a substantive exchange of
views. Thus, the liberal account of the preclusion of controverted issues,
especially in its more extreme form, has paid too little attention to ele-
mentary due process considerations and fairness issues, and to the fore-
seeable adverse effects on the integrity of public debate, conflict
resolution, and public peace.8"
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESTRANGEMENT
A. The Loss of Moral and Religious Fluency
The outcome of this shifting public-private boundary is a commu-
nity life based upon a very thin theory of the good-if that at all-with
maximum liberty residing in the individual regarding matters that are
morally or religiously disputed. By entrusting the resolution of certain
moral and religious-ethical issues to the discrete and isolated judgment of
each citizen, liberal fundamentalism undermines important elements of
the social democratic state and, in effect, transforms us from a morally
substantive political community into a nation of sovereign treaty makers.
In this respect what I have called Enlightenment fundamentalism betrays
the classical liberal confidence in the power of rational public discourse
to achieve substantive moral agreement. What is needed is not statism,
in which the state defines the conception of the good for us and coerces
our obedience if necessary. Nor do we need a minimalist state that has a
conception of the good that is so diffuse as to be nonoperational. But
what we do need is a political community whose members are capable of
engaging one another in substantive discourse both about the common
85. In their article, Professors Gutmann and Thompson also addressed the importance of
deploying "principles of accommodation which govern the conduct of the moral disagreement
on issues that should reach the political agenda." Id. at 126. The principal object of such
rules is civility in public discourse, so that the manner in which public deliberation is con-
ducted should foster the democratic virtues of openness, tolerance, and mutual respect. To
that end, one set of such principles would require demonstrating the integrity of one's consid-
ered moral judgment: "political sincerity" as opposed to expediency, "consistency between
speech and action" as evidence of one's moral integrity, and "accepting the broader implica-
tions of the principles presupposed by their moral positions." Id. at 136-37. A second set of
accommodation principles is based upon the democratic virtue of "magnaminity": recognizing
the status of an opponent's position as a "moral one," cultivating "a disposition toward open-
ness" in the sense of being ready to reexamine, revise, and change past decisions and policies,
and finally, "seeking the rationale which minimizes rejection of the [opposing] position." Id.
at 137-39. Any assessment of the negative impact that privatizing moral controversy has upon
these features of political society is noticeably absent from the liberal fundamentalist's strategy
of preclusion.
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good and for the common good. In contrast to this admirable ideal of
liberal democracy, instead of having to engage in the difficult work of
forming a consensus through an unrestricted moral and religious-ethical
discourse, Enlightenment fundamentalists tell us to go home, decide pri-
vately a certain number of discrete questions, and act accordingly.
One of the most serious consequences of this tendency toward solip-
sism-that is, the liberal move toward a radical subjectivism and isola-
tion of self from all others-has been identified and very thoughtfully
described by Professor Charles Taylor as rendering the community mor-
ally inarticulate.86 The gravity of this impediment to moral discourse in
our society should not be underestimated. First, our political institu-
tions, which are broader than government institutions as such, are instru-
mental expressions of our collective moral selves. In that regard they
also play a crucial socialization function. In the absence of moral flu-
ency, those institutions may lose the capacity for renewal and restate-
ment, which is necessary from time to time. Second, in the absence of
such fluency, mutual respect, understanding, and civility must be sought
not by appeals to established public values and customs but through
"speech codes" and other types of coercive legislation. The third and
perhaps most important aspect of moral articulacy is that it is generated
by an existing moral consensus and is a necessary condition for building
the political consensus needed to resolve current and future conflicts. In
a democratic society such as ours, which is increasingly heterodox in
matters of religion and morality, it is imperative that we develop and
maintain the civic capacity and institutional structures necessary for
resolving moral and religious-ethical controversies. To that end moral
and religious fluency are essential to mutual understanding, mutual re-
spect, and conflict resolution. Without that social regard and fellow-feel-
ing, no society-and certainly not one as heterogeneous as ours-that
aspires to democratic governance and public peace is likely to achieve
ordered liberty through public discourse. If the privatization of moral
and religious belief continues, not only may the estrangement of law and
religion deepen, but divisiveness and factionalism may very well inten-
sify. Consequently, there will be less common ground and political com-
promise. On this view, the necessary elements of democratic life-such
as a desire for the common good, open public debate and deliberation,
the ability to compromise, and the capacity to reconcile factions after a
86. See TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 91-107 (describing how modem moral philosophy has
undermined our sense of good and has caused inarticulacy regarding those constitutive goods,
which serve as moral sources according to which we live, and from which we derive much of
our identity); TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 13-23 (making similar argument).
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dispute achieves a certain measure of legal finality-seem to have been
utterly disregarded by Enlightenment fundamentalism.
B. The Adverse Effects of the Estrangement on the Rule of Law
Thus far, I have tried to establish that the estrangement between law
and religion is an extremely grave matter because it undermines mean-
ingful public discussion, debate, and political decision making. This phe-
nomenon has been caused in no small measure by a strand of liberalism
that tends to marginalize and oppress religious liberty in the public
square, and that achieves that end by disregarding the cardinal principles
of the liberal tradition. But this state of affairs also threatens an even
deeper democratic structure. Unless reconciled, the estrangement of law
and religion may very well subvert the rule of law and democratic
governance.
Democratic governance assumes the interiorization of the rule of
law as the habit of law observance whereby the citizen accepts and re-
spects the authority of the law partly because of its rationality and
nonarbitrariness and partly because of the manner of its democratic for-
mation. However, more importantly, the very possibility of the rule of
law as law observance exists primarily if not necessarily because the sub-
stantive content of the law corresponds to the considered moral judg-
ments and religious sensibilities of the governed. 7 Laws permitting
slavery, denying the franchise to women, and prohibiting the sale of alco-
hol were abrogated precisely because the content of those laws trespassed
upon the deeply held moral or religious beliefs of large segments of the
political community. I submit, for example, that increasingly restrictive
abortion laws and resistance to the legalization of homosexuality will
continue unless the moral insights and religious beliefs of the political
community radically change. The rule of law in this sense depends upon
the moral and religious resonances of the public law. 8 It is that founda-
tion that, in addition to gaining the general intellectual and moral con-
sent of the governed, cultivates the habit of law-observance.
87. The correspondence of the content of law with the substantive moral and religious
horizons of the community tells us nothing about the moral quality of any such regime. As in
the case of fascist or totalitarian regimes, there is no guarantee that "that which is legal" is
".moral." In this respect, the positivist thesis could not be more correct in distinguishing law
and morality.
88. For a contemporary effort to recover a natural law foundation for positive law, see
FINNIS, supra note 43, and NATURAL LAW THEORY (Robert P. George ed., 1992), for an
excellent collection of critical essays examining the revival of interest in natural law theory in
jurisprudence and ethics.
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While respect for the authoritative foundations of law is an essential
condition for the efficacy of the rule of law, "the law" as such cannot
provide that condition. The sources of law I have in mind are found in
the subsidiary communities of family, ethnicity, circle of friends, neigh-
borhood, religion, school, work, play, and the like, which, in the aggre-
gate, compose the local, state, and federal political communities-as
distinguished from the institutions of government-and which help shape
the character of its members. Accordingly, the rule of law should thus
eagerly welcome the moral and religious insights of those individuals and
communities who are asked to obey the laws of our complex society as
well as those who make, enforce, and adjudicate them. As an expression
of the moral character and spirit of the governed, those insights disclose
and invite further refinement of the civic, moral stance that each citizen
must take regarding his or her neighbor in almost every setting. On this
account the religious and moral aspects of communal life are the primary
civilizing and socializing horizons within which the democratic state
finds its being.89 To disregard the religious dimensions of human experi-
ence and a large portion of the moral sphere, and categorically to exclude
those sources of knowledge about the human condition from the forma-
tion of public policy regarding controverted matters, is certainly possible;
we have done so, to a large degree in the name of liberalism, for the last
half-century. But this is a dangerous social strategy.9"
The recognition of an authoritative moral obligation in public law is,
I submit, a necessary condition in a democratic society for the ordered
well-being of self, of family, of neighbor, and of the various civic, moral,
and religious communities that comprise the political community.9 The
practice of religion and religious-ethical discourse have traditionally
played significant roles in cultivating the habit of that recognition. The
estrangement of law and religion places that habit and the stability of
that essential sociopolitical condition in some doubt, if not in serious
89. By the term "horizon" I mean the structure or framework of meaning that orients and
.guides the development of self and society. See TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 14-19 (identifying
and discussing significance of "loss of horizon" in modem culture).
90. Signs of the degradation of the rule of law are as varied as they are abundant. Con-
sider, for example, the anarchy expressed in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the rise of gang vio-
lence and organized crime among marginalized racial and ethnic minorities, or the occurrence
of homosexual marriages contrary to public law.
91. This notion of ordered liberty in society requires a conception of the human person
that is rational, responsible, capable of self-rule, and having the desire and discursive capacity
to participate in deliberative, democratic governance. One might call this a democratic ideal-
anthropology. Implicit in this description of the ideal democratic self are other characteristics
such as intelligence, imagination, freedom of the will, sociality, and moral and religious
sensibilities.
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jeopardy. In light of the foregoing, democratic governance is itself
threatened. Because the rule of law presupposes a positive relation be-
tween law and religion, the debasement of this form of human self-tran-
scendence92-- the love of self and neighbor expressed in the rule of law,
which Enlightenment fundamentalism seems to ignore-is accordingly
a manifestation of an extremely serious intellectual, moral, and religious
crisis.
V. SIGNS OF THE ESTRANGEMENT IN SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
While Congress is expressly prohibited by the First Amendment
from making any law "respecting the establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof,"94 these interdependent prohibitions were
not construed by the framers of the Bill of Rights, or by any branch of
the federal government, until the middle of the twentieth century, as re-
quiring the government to separate itself entirely or even substantially
from the religious faith and practices of its citizens. Although the per-
missible scope of church-state relations intended by the framers of the
First Amendment is controverted by constitutional scholars and histori-
92. As Professor Harold Berman has shown, religion and law share common elements,
such as the use of ritual, tradition, authority, and universality. See BERMAN, supra note 17, at
31-39. By his account, law is a kindred spirit of religion in that both are activities that "com-
municate[ ] transrational values" and comprehend "man's whole being, including his dreams,
his passions, his ultimate concerns." Id at 31. While it is clear that law as an activity engages
the whole person, the limited scope of law should be distinguished from the comprehensiveness
of religious belief and practice according to their respective teleologies. The telos of law is the
fulfillment of the human desire for ordered liberty and basic justice. The telos of religion is the
comprehensive truth about God and the relation of humanity to God. Religion intersects the
teleology of law insofar as it seeks the religious and moral meaning of the exercise of liberty
under law and the obligations of justice. On that account, the culture of law cannot disregard
the moral and religious foundations upon which the civic virtue of law-observance is based.
Furthermore, the culture of religion, even in a pluralistic society, will not remain silent if such
foundations are ignored.
93. I am thinking here of the deep respect and mutual regard we have for ourselves and for
others when we desire and will the very best good for ourselves and our neighbors and seek to
express that will in public law. This love of goodness and its relation to law in general gives
rise to the habit of desiring the best particular good, as opposed to aggregate good, in every
situation for myself, my family and friends, my neighbors, and the respective communities that
shape and give meaning to my life. Furthermore, this desire expressed in a law-abiding and
other-regarding disposition is an absolutely necessary condition for the civilizing and humaniz-
ing efficacy of individual and associational liberty under law.
94. The First Amendment reads in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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ans,9" it is at least clear that the religion clauses96 have never been under-
stood to prohibit official expressions of theism, 97 nor were they construed
for more than 150 years to disable the federal government and the several
states from enacting a variety of laws "respecting religion."9 8
Until the religion clauses of the First Amendment were applied to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 99 the Supreme Court's construction of the Establishment"ic and
Free Exercise Clauses0 1 had been rare but had generally followed liber-
95. Compare LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 149-55 (rev. ed. 1967) (ad-
vancing thesis that intent of First Amendment is to render government and religion completely
independent) with ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 15 (1982) (de-
fending narrow construction of religion clauses and denying presence of any credible historical
evidence that "the First Amendment was intended to provide an absolute separation or inde-
pendence of religion and the national state [since] [t]he actions of the early Congresses and
Presidents, in fact, suggest quite the opposite").
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97. Neither the First Congress nor any successive one has concluded that the First
Amendment prohibited it from employing federal chaplains whose prayers to God for the
deliberations of the members of Congress have begun each working day during the legislative
sessions of the House of Representatives and the Senate since Congress first assembled. Even
the Supreme Court, which begins its proceedings by invoking God's mercy-"God save the
United States and this Honorable Court"--does not seem to have a constitutional scruple
about that judicial prayer nor does it seem to be concerned about the religious message likely
to be drawn from the depiction of Moses with the Ten Commandments, which adorns the
Court's public chambers.
98. Thus, when Congress establishes and maintains a prayer chapel in the Capitol Build-
ing, when the President commissions Jewish rabbis, Roman Catholic priests, and Protestant
ministers as military officers to serve as chaplains in the armed forces and in the military
service academies, and when Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and others negotiated
treaty provisions with various Indian nations, later ratified by the Senate, that expressly pro-
vided for the direct federal support of religion, the federal government is and was passing and
executing laws "respecting religion" but not thereby "establishing" it. See CORD, supra note
95, at 49-82; GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-99
(1987) (reviewing historical record of acts of First Congress and its successors and finding
overwhelming evidence for conclusion that "government aid, support and encouragement of
religion [was] perfectly consistent with the religion clauses"). In the Northwest Ordinance of
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (obsolete), Congress expressly endorsed the notion that "religion, moral-
ity and knowledge, being necessary for good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
99. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (applying Establishment Clause
to uphold New Jersey statute authorizing local school districts to provide reimbursement for
transportation costs of children attending parochial schools even though children attending
private for-profit schools were not eligible for state subsidy); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-05 (1940) (applying religion clauses of First Amendment to states and holding uncon-
stitutional, on free exercise grounds, statute requiring discretionary licensing of bona fide reli-
gious solicitations).
100. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
101. Id.
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ally construed accommodationist principles.102  However, the modem
Court, particularly under Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Bur-
ger, largely abandoned that historically warranted church-state settle-
ment and embraced a rather strict separationist policy. Accordingly,
some of the most telling examples of the estrangement of law and reli-
gion-and of liberal fundamentalism at times-may be found in the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court construing the religion clauses during the last
half-century. In a great many cases, the Court has disclosed a deep and
abiding suspicion, if not a certain measure of hostility, toward religion in
a variety of public settings. While some of the decisions of the Rehnquist
Court indicate that it may be returning to a more traditional interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses,103 it will be helpful to review, even if briefly,
the Court's modem approach to religion, with special attention given to
its Establishment Clause cases, to illustrate how the Court has mirrored
and contributed to the estrangement of law and religion.
102. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872) (adopting rule of deference for
civil courts regarding internal matters of faith and church polity in hierarchial ecciesial as-
sociations because inquiring into such matters would result in "the total subversion of such
religious bodies"); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465, 471 (1892)
(refusing to apply immigration statute to Episcopal minister on grounds that Congress could
not have intended to prohibit emigration of "ministers of the Gospel," and because "this is a
Christian nation"); Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (finding no Establish-
ment Clause issue in Commissioner of Indian Affairs's decision to provide for Catholic educa-
tion of certain members of Sioux nation through tuition payments to Bureau of Catholic
Missions with monies drawn from federal trust funds and annual treaty obligation appropria-
tions); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding congressional power to appropri-
ate monies for construction and operation of hospital in District of Columbia on property
owned by Roman Catholic religious order that would also operate federally funded facility).
But see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (sustaining Idaho franchise condition that, in
requiring sworn denunciation of bigamy and polygamy, effectively denied vote to all orthodox
Mormons); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (sustaining Congress's power to
prohibit polygamy even though it thereby criminalized essential Mormon religious practice).
103. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)
(holding that exclusion of church group from use of public school facilities that were otherwise
open to wide variety of individuals and associations simply because church wanted to present
film series on nature of family from religious viewpoint violated Free Speech Clause, and that
school district would not violate Establishment Clause by opening its facilities to such groups);
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (sustaining Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
377, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988)), which
required public schools to permit student groups formed for religious purposes to meet on
school premises under same access conditions extended to all other noncurricular student
clubs and groups); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (permitting religious organizations
to participate in delivery of counseling services to adolescents, including pregnancy counseling
and sexual abstinence); Corporation of Presiding Bishops v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (hold-
ing that although Free Exercise Clause did not require exemption, government does not violate
Establishment Clause by exempting church from operation of antidiscrimination statutes so
that it might follow its own sense of religious mission).
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From Everson v. Board of Education 104 to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 105
and more recently in Lee v. Weisman,1 6 the modem Court has con-
structed an Establishment Clause jurisprudence composed of decisions
that many commentators have found difficult to reconcile. 10 7 Further-
more, some members of the Court have described this body of law as
confused if not unprincipled 08 and based upon a flawed reading of the
history of the First Amendment. 09 All too often, the Court has an-
nounced a rule of decision in one setting and then abandoned it in a
factually similar case."' 0 While the Court has expressly rejected the no-
104. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding school district reimbursement of transportation costs of
parochial school children while simultaneously declaring that "[t]he 'establishment of religion'
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another").
105. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (announcing that, for Establishment Clause purposes, a
statute respecting religion must "[f]irst, . . . have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, [and third,
it must not] foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'" (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
106. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding that middle school policy permitting clergyman to
offer nonsectarian prayer during graduation ceremony violated Establishment Clause).
107. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Up-
date, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5 (1987); William P. Marshall, We Know It When We See It: The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986); McConnell, supra note 18.
108. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that Louisiana statute requir-
ing teaching of creationism if evolution is taught in public schools was facially unconstitu-
tional). In dissent Justice Scalia expressed his dismay over the Court's Establishment Clause
cases. He explained:
Our cases interpreting and applying the [Establishment Clause] have made such a
maze... that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what
motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the following: Gov-
ernment may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to
do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminating
existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when
merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except at
some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering of
religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (offering ex-
tensive review of historical record in effort to correct "mistaken understanding of constitu-
tional history" upon which Court's Establishment Clause cases have been based since
Everson).
110. For example, as applied to religious exhibits, compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in municipality's annual display of na-
tivity scene during Christmas season) with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding unconstitutional nativity display that had been donated and set up by Roman
Catholic organization, on staircase of county courthouse, but permitting 18-foot menorah that,
though owned by Jewish organization, was erected by city next to 40-foot Christmas tree and
accompanied by sign that read "Salute to Liberty"). As to tuition reimbursement, compare
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding un-
constitutional tuition reimbursement and tax credit program for costs of nonpublic education)
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tion that the Establishment Clause requires the complete separation of
church and state, II the Court seems to have put into practice what it has
denied in theory. This pattern has been particularly noticeable in the
context of public education where the Court has broadly construed the
Establishment Clause and held unconstitutional a great variety of state
accommodations of religion.1"'
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, the Court also considered reli-
gious liberty rather infrequently. The distinction between religious belief
and practice that developed in the Mormon cases 13 is an essential ana-
lytical element of that jurisprudence. While neither religious belief nor
practice may be coerced, I 4 religious practices, even if required by church
dogma, may be regulated and even penalized in certain circumstances. 1I5
with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state income tax deduction for tuition,
textbook, and transportation expenses incurred by parents of children attending public or non-
public primary and secondary schools). Finally, in the context of public school release time
programs, compare Illinois ex. rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding
unconstitutional public school program that permitted sectarian students, on voluntary basis,
to be released from class during school day in order to attend privately financed and staffed
religious education classes on school premises) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(upholding similar "release time" program for sectarian students when religious instruction
was not provided on school premises).
111. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 ("[IThe Constitution [does not] require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all reli-
gions, and forbids hostility toward any"); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760 ("It has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation.").
112. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding unconstitutional
remedial instructional program for parochial school children staffed by public school special-
ists on parochial school's premises); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding program
lending secular instructional materials to nonpublic schools and providing variety of auxiliary
educational services staffed by public employees unconstitutionally aided religious mission of
sectarian schools); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding that state
subsidy of mandatory testing in all primary and secondary schools impermissibly subsidized
religious activities in parochial schools); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(striking down Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes permitting morning Bible readings in pub-
lic schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional New York statute
requiring public school teachers to lead classes in vocal prayer).
113. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
114. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The government is also prohibited from
imposing civil disabilities because of religious status. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187
(1946).
115. While the Mormon cases were premised upon the belief/practice distinction, the con-
clusion is unavoidable that the United States Congress sought to suppress the Mormon belief
in religious polygamy as much as its practice, given Congress's decision to revoke the Church's
charter in 1887 and to confiscate most of its assets in response to Mormon civil disobedience.
See Late Corp., 136 U.S. 1.
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In applying this distinction to various aspects of the modem administra-
tive state, the Court has carved out a number of free exercise exemptions
from laws of general applicability. However, outside of the unemploy-
ment compensation context, the Court's protection of free exercise has
been largely rhetorical. Even though the Court made clear in Sherbert v.
Verner' 16 and its progeny that neutral laws of general applicability that
substantially burdened the free exercise of religion must pass strict scru-
tiny, the Court, in applying that purportedly rigorous test prior to its
1992-1993 term, decided to protect religious liberty in nonunemployment
compensation cases only once,117 did not apply the test at all in a variety
of "special circumstances," ' and abandoned that standard entirely in
the criminal law context in Employment Division v. Smith.1 19
The Court's view of religion during this period reveals a general sec-
ular bias. This was clearly Justice Hugo Black's view who, although
writing for the majority in Everson, argued that the Establishment Clause
prohibited federal and state legislatures from passing laws that "aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another," and fur-
116. 374 U.S. 398, 402-09 (1963) (requiring compelling state interest analysis for denial of
unemployment compensation to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on her sabbath
day); see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (protecting
sincerely held belief of unchurched person that Sunday work was contrary to his religion);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (requiring unemployment
compensation benefits for employee whose religious conversion after employment began cre-
ated religious conflict); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (declaring Jehovah's Wit-
ness who refused to work in armament factory on religious grounds eligible for benefits).
117. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In applying the Sherbert rule elsewhere,
the Court found either that the government's action was not sufficiently burdensome to a reli-
gious practice or belief or that there existed a compelling justification. See, e.g., Jimmy Swag-
gart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1990) (finding no burden);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 709 (1986) (finding no burden); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (finding compelling federal interest); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 258-59 (1982) (finding compelling federal interest).
118. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (refus-
ing to apply strict scrutiny in case involving use of federal lands); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny in case involving worship services in
prison); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny in case
involving military dress code).
119. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (refusing to apply Sherbert rule
to denial of unemployment benefits to persons discharged from their jobs because of religious
use of peyote). In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia-following the rule of Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which permitted the criminalization of religious practices
without compelling justification-held that Oregon's decision not to exempt the religious use
of peyote from its general criminal law prohibiting the possession and ingestion of the drug did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause. But he also made it clear that Oregon could grant an
exemption, as had several other states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3402(b)(l)-(3)
(1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(d) (Michie
1989).
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ther required that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, [should] be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion."12 Justice John Rutledge, writing in dissent, advanced an even
more rigorous interpretation. According to him, the purpose of the
nonestablishment principle was:
to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbid-
ding every form of public aid or support for religion .... The
prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of
religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of pub-
lic funds for religious purposes.
1 21
On this account, government is constitutionally required to pursue only
secular purposes, and may not take actions that favor religion over non-
religion or endorse any religious faith.'22
Consistent with a secular bias, members of the Court have expressed
the belief that religion, especially in the context of primary and secon-
dary public education, is a form of propaganda, which must employ vari-
ous means of indoctrination to gain acceptance. 123 This was certainly
Justice Black's disposition whose anti-Catholic bigotry was only lightly
cloaked when he referred to Catholics as "powerful sectarian religious
propagandists" who were intent upon achieving the "complete domina-
tion and supremacy of their particular brand of religion."' 124  Justice
Douglas also seemed to share a negative view of Catholicism. 12  Even
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concurring in Wallace v. Jaffree,126 made
clear her view that the evil to be avoided in the school prayer cases was
120. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
121. Id. at 31-33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
122. However, this view has not gone unchallenged. For example, in Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Goldberg objected that this secular bias proceeded from
an untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality which can lead to invocation or
approval of results which partake ... of a brooding and pervasive dedication to the
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not
only not compelled by the Constitution, but.., are prohibited by it.
Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
L. BOETrNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360 (1962)).
124. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
125. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 635 n.20 (quoting with apparent approval vicious anti-Catholic
polemicist).
126. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (declaring unconstitutional Alabama statute that authorized public
school teachers to hold one-minute period of silence for purpose of meditation or voluntary
prayer).
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not simply "the coercion implicit in the statutory schemes." '127 The more
serious danger of "government-sponsored religious exercises" is that
such programs "are directed at impressionable children.""12 In addition
to perceiving religion as coercive propaganda that is harmful to impres-
sionable children, the Court has also indicated that religion is largely
subjective129 and that it is characteristically "divisive" 130 and need not be
rationally comprehensible to warrant First Amendment protection.1 3 1 In
light of such "reasons," the Court has held that various accommodations
threaten to establish religion either because the reasonable nonbeliever
finds such arrangements objectionable or because they fail one or more
aspects of various Establishment Clause tests. 132
127. Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Such "coercion" leaves the nonbelieving student
"with the choice of participating, thereby compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or with-
drawing, thereby calling attention to his or her nonconformity." Id.
128. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). Because of the mandatory attendance requirement, Justice
O'Connor concluded that "government endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced
religious beliefs." Id.; see Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (noting
that danger to be avoided by state is "enlisting-at least in eyes of impressionable youngsters-
powers of government to support of religious denomination operating school").
129. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (finding moral and philosophical
beliefs to be functional equivalents of religious convictions in that setting and, therefore, quali-
fying as exemption despite Congress's express prohibition). In essence the Court rejected the
congressional judgment that religion is distinguishable from idiosyncratic subjective belief.
130. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 287 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing religions as "divisive forces" that should be barred from public schools); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15 (1975) (citing fears of political division in striking down
auxiliary services program for nonpublic schools); Committee of Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 795-97 (1973) (striking down tuition voucher plan in part because it could be politi-
cally divisive). This line of argument was first introduced in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, warned that "political division along religious lines was
one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect" and
that "[t]he potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process."
Id. See also Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entan-
glement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 295 (1980),
for a critical assessment of this aspect of the Court's view of religion.
131. For example, although the Court in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
showed considerable deference to Thomas's religious beliefs and upheld his Free Exercise
claim, the Court nevertheless used language suggesting that religion is idiosyncratic if not
irrational. In discussing "the determination of what is a 'religious belief' or practice," the
Court expressed the view that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Id. at 714.
132. In addition to the three separate elements of the Lemon test, several members of the
Court have also employed an endorsement test, see, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76
(1985) (noting that unconstitutional endorsement occurs when "an objective observer, ac-
quainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive
[the action] as a state endorsement of [religion]") (O'Connor, J., concurring), and a coercion
test, see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-59 (1992) (finding unconstitutional "coer-
cion" where government directs formal religious exercise that obliges dissenter either to suffer
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Consistent with the notion that the Court has reflected the estrange-
ment between law and religion, Professor Michael McConnell has per-
suasively argued that the Court's negative stance toward religion has
been clearly expressed, not simply in the application of the Lemon test,
but also in its essential elements, which have "an inherent tendency to
devalue religious exercise. '  Consequently, the modem Court "placed
the welfare-regulatory state on a collision course with religious freedom"
such that "[a]s the sphere of government expanded, the field of religious
pluralism had to shrink." '134 While it is clear that the Court has at times
followed traditional accommodationist principles in construing the Es-
tablishment Clause13 and has also required the government not simply
to tolerate but affirmatively to protect religious liberty,13 6 the negative
view of religion found in the Court's precedents continues to surface even
in its latest opinions.
In construing the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman,"3 7 the
Court was sharply divided in its analysis of the place of even nonsec-
tarian prayer in public school settings. A strict separationist mood domi-
nated Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion. The nonsectarian
prayer struck down in Weisman was constitutionally offensive because
the state-sponsored invocation and benediction at a middle school gradu-
ation ceremony was a naked attempt "[t]o persuade or compel a student
to participate in [a] religious exercise,"' 38 which caused the nonbelieving
student and parent to suffer psychological harm, given "[t]he embarrass-
"the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise" or to protest "an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy").
133. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 128-34 (demonstrating deficiencies of each of three
prongs of Lemon test).
134. Id. at 134.
135. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (permitting religiously affiliated
organizations to participate in Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 US.C. § 302 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), federal program designed to provide variety of services to pregnant teenagers, including
efforts by church groups to encourage sexual chastity); Witters v. Department of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 484 (1986) (upholding application of neutral state tuition aid program to costs
of seminary training for blind student who sought to become religious minister); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state income tax de-
duction for educational expenses that disproportionately favored parents of parochial school
children).
136. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138-40 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
137. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
138. Id. at 2661.
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ment and the intrusion of a religious exercise." 139  Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing for the dissenters, argued that, given "the history and tra-
dition ...of prayers of thanksgiving and petition" in public ceremo-
nies, " the denial of prayer in this setting "is as senseless in policy as it is
unsupported in law."14 In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict,42 the Court was once again sharply divided 43 and showed further
signs of the estrangement of law and religion. Although the majority
there found no Establishment Clause objection to state-funding of a sign-
language interpreter for a deaf student enrolled in a pervasively sectarian
high school, 1" Justice Harry Blackmun's dissent repeated the separa-
tionist's refrain that "[the] government crosses the [constitutional]
boundary when it furnishes the medium for communication of a religious
message."'45 Because "[i]n an environment so pervaded by discussions
of the divine, the interpreter's every gesture would be infused with reli-
gious significance,"' 46 Justice Blackmun found the service to be an un-
constitutional participation in the school's religious mission.
139. Id at 2659. In a recent application of Weisman, which the Supreme Court has left
undisturbed, the Fifth Circuit found no constitutional impediment to a secondary school ad-
ministrator's decision to allow graduation prayers offered by student volunteers in accord with
a majority vote of the student body. See Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). The Fifth
Circuit had previously reached the same result applying the Lemon test, which judgment the
Supreme Court had vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Weisman. Id.
140. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. 113 S. Ct. 2462.
143. Although the Court split five-to-four, two of the dissenters expressed no view on the
merits because they objected to deciding the constitutional issue at that particular time. Id. at
2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Consequently, even if the newest member of the Court, Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, assumes a separationist posture toward such aid, it is not clear how
the Court might resolve a similar case in the future.
144. Notwithstanding unresolved state constitutional and federal statutory and regulatory
issues, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Zobrest majority, characterized the provision of
a sign-interpreter as part of a neutral school aid program, which created no financial incentive
for parents to choose a sectarian school. Thus, "[the] interpreter's presence [could not] be
attributed to state decisionmaking." Id. The fact that this service was offered on the premises
of a parochial school was nothing more than an incidental consequence of a parental choice of
schools. Thus, the Court noted that "[w]hen the government offers a neutral service on the
premises of a sectarian school as a part of a general program that 'is in no way skewed toward
religion,'" such programs do not offend the Establishment Clause. Id. (citations omitted)
(quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)).
145. Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). One wonders whether Justice
Blackmun on similar grounds would prohibit religious programming by federal licensees and
cable operators who are clearly providing "the medium for communication of a religious
message." See id
146. Id. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [l
As the Court's studied indifference to minority religious practices
expressed in Smith is emblematic of the estrangement of law and reli-
gion, that decision warrants a more extensive comment. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, revealed that the Rehnquist Court's narrow
reading of the Free Exercise Clause signified its repudiation of the com-
pelling state interest test in all but the rarest of circumstances. 147 Ac-
cording to the Court, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the appropriate
institution for the discernment of the creation of a nondiscriminatory
religious practice exemption to otherwise neutral laws of general applica-
bility. 148 Apparently untroubled by the inability of minority religions to
secure legislative exemptions, Justice Scalia wrote:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the polit-
ical process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the cen-
trality of religious beliefs. 149
Smith therefore signaled a severe restriction of the Sherbert test and,
more importantly, the Rehnquist Court's willingness to commit to the
political process, outside of the rare instances of overt religious discrimi-
nation, the constitutional protection of minority religious practices.
As an element of constitutional theory, Smith stands the Free Exer-
cise Clause on its head by implying that the contours of religious liberty
should be substantially shaped by the political branches. As conceived
by the framers, religious liberty is a limitation upon the power of govern-
ment. To force religion to become a plaintiff before the legislature and
beg permission to engage in its central religious practices is constitutional
heresy. It implies a power not ceded to government and essentially de-
grades the constitutional status of religious liberty.15 0
147. In choosing not to require Oregon to exempt a "central religious belief" like the ritual
use of peyote from the scope of its criminal law, the Court followed the rule laid down in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). While the notion that sincerely held religious
beliefs and practices that conflict with public law may not be entitled to an exemption is not
controversial, what was surprising was the Court's suggestion that all religions should look to
the political process for religious practice exemptions rather than to the courts.
148. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). In this regard, Justice Scalia
wrote: "[To] say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even
that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate
occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts." Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. For an excellent discussion of Smith, see McConnell, supra note 18, at 137-40; Jesse
H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB.
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While Justice Scalia correctly notes that religious liberty is "[not] a
law unto itself," and is subject to police regulation like all other funda-
mental constitutional rights, his abdication of strict judicial scrutiny of
the government's justification for such an intrusion could not be more
wrong. 151 Because religious liberty is not constitutionally inferior to free-
dom of speech or of the press, any restraint upon it should require the
same compelling state interest justification demanded of state restrictions
of those First Amendment liberties. Before Smith was decided, I would
have thought that had Congress not exempted the sacramental use of
wine during Prohibition, the Court would have concluded that, absent an
extremely compelling reason, the Free Exercise Clause required such an
exemption for adversely affected religious communities. Such an exemp-
tion should not depend, as Justice Scalia suggests, upon whether
Catholics and Jews have grown numerous enough or powerful enough to
demand and receive a legislative exemption. It should be given because
the form of ritual worship is a matter of religious liberty that may not be
regulated by any government unless some very grave reason requires it.
But in light of Smith, Justice Scalia apparently would advise his fellow
Roman Catholics to seek the permission of the government if they de-
sired to participate fully in their sacramental rites, were a hypothetical
legislative majority to conclude in the future that such practices
threatened the community.
The Smith Court's apparent indifference to minority religious prac-
tice is stunning. The religious use of peyote is no less central to the Na-
tive American church than is wine to Roman Catholicism and Judaism.
The failure of the Rehnquist Court to require Oregon to exempt that use
on free exercise grounds in the absence of a compelling state interest is
one of the more egregious examples of the estrangement of law and reli-
gion.152 At least in Reynolds v. United States,' the Court recognized
the government's need to justify the criminalization of polygamy. But
here the Court simply deferred to the state's admittedly rational, but con-
stitutionally inadequate, decision to proscribe the general use of peyote.
Even the Court's latest free exercise decision protecting the religious sac-
L. REV. 651 (1991); and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CH. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
151. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
152. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(finding it unnecessary for government to advance compelling reason for knowing destruction
of ancient worship sites sacred to several Native American Nations).
153. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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rifice of animals 54 is consistent with Smith because the city ordinances
there held unconstitutional were neither "neutral" nor "generally appli-
cable" but were clearly directed toward the suppression of the practice of
the Santeria religion."' 5
While the foregoing review of the modem Court's Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence reveals a rather consis-
tent pattern of secular bias and a negative view of religion, this is but one
symptom of a more systemic estrangement between law and religion.
Conciliating that disaffection is imperative.
VI. R ECONCILING THE ESTRANGEMENT
If the alienation of law and religion described in this Article is at all
accurate, we may be in the midst of an intellectual, moral, and political
crisis of rather critical significance.' 56 Given the current state of affairs,
it is hardly surprising that our tradition of church-state dialogue, which
has encouraged a robust interdisciplinary exchange between the institu-
tions of democratic governance and the religious communities within the
body politic, is in doubt. Notwithstanding the depth of the problem, I
believe that the estrangement between law and religion may be recon-
ciled. To that end, several independent but complementary strategies
seem promising.
First, as the primary source of the alienation lies in an intellectual
bias against religion, what is needed initially is a recognition and diagno-
sis of the nature and depth of the bias itself. Studies revealing the pres-
ence of the bias would be useful. Because antireligious bigotry is largely
hidden, and will not readily be admitted even by liberal fundamentalists,
154. Church of the Lukumi Babaluaye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (holding
unconstitutional series of municipal ordinances designed to prohibit religious sacrifice of ani-
mals, which practice is central to Santeria religion).
155. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, fully embraced the Smith rule of decision as
summarizing the free exercise principle:
In addressing the constitutional protection for the free exercise of religion, our cases
establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. A law failing to satisfy
[neutrality and general applicability] must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Id. at 2276 (citation omitted).
156. The social consequences of the breach are regrettably abundant: the lack of virtue and
civility that pervades so many quarters of our society, the rise of extreme factionalism, the
cultivated selfishness which drives the engine of materialism and consumerism, the moral inar-
ticulateness of too many of our citizens, and the corruption of too many of our religious,
moral, and political leaders and institutions. These characteristics of our society reveal an
intellectual, moral, and religious decline.
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successfully confronting this prejudice will be difficult. Absent an intel-
lectual, moral, or religious conversion, not much can be done to persuade
individuals or institutions with deep-seated animosities toward religion to
examine their prejudice much less to become free of it. However, un-
masking that prejudice may help diminish its adverse sociopolitical ef-
fects. In addition, it has been my experience that this bias is often rooted
not so much in ill will as it is in ignorance. Many intellectuals are simply
not familiar with religion in general and even less so with the modem
scholarship of religious men and women in theology, philosophy, social
ethics, law, political theory, and the like. Thus, perhaps what is needed
is the cultivation of a desire for discovery and self-disclosure between
religious intellectuals and their nonreligious colleagues, as well as the
creation of opportunities for such exchanges. To that end faculty collo-
quia concerning religion in various university settings or even programs
sponsored by the national media might do much to dispel ignorance and
increase mutual understanding.
1 1
7
To advance that educative process, interdisciplinary symposia dedi-
cated exclusively to the dialogue between law and religion would be very
helpful. 5 In addition, law schools, in conjunction with graduate
schools of philosophy, theology, and political science, might consider col-
laborative ventures in the study of law and religion." 9 At a more funda-
mental level, university faculty and administrators might consider
renewing their commitment to "the work of self-reformation" and ac-
cordingly examine the place of the study of religion in their curricular
offerings and make appropriate adjustments where necessary.' 60 Finally,
universities and public interest foundations might profitably follow the
example of Princeton University and the Lily Endowment, which estab-
lished a Project on Church and State at Princeton University for the pur-
157. Being intellectually and morally virtuous, these estranged colleagues may indeed dis-
cover that faith is not the enemy of reason; they may also discover what is false about the
notion that "a religious intellectual" is an oxymoron.
158. Interdisciplinary scholarly journals regularly investigating public affairs from religious
perspectives would be of great service in advancing the dialogue as well.
159. Furthermore, centers for the study of law and religion even from a clearly defined
religious viewpoint might be established in law schools. The Center for Jewish Law at Saint
Louis University School of Law was established in 1990 by one of my colleagues, Professor
Roger Goldman, with the full support of then-Dean Rudolph Hasl. The purpose of the Center
is to explore the influence of Jewish law in the secular legal culture through the visitation of
law professors and Jewish law scholars from Israeli universities, with special attention given to
the religious foundations of public law.
160. This phrase--"the task of self-reformation"-is from the classic work JOHN HENRY
CARDINAL NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY (Martin J. Svaglic ed., 1982) (1875),
which Jaroslav Pelikan recently reexamined. See JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE IDEA OF THE
UNIVERSITY: A REEXAMINATION 168 (1992).
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pose of sponsoring "scholarly publications on the interaction of religion
and its political environment" and "to draw on disciplines beyond those
traditionally concerned with church-state issues to investigate that inter-
action." '16 1 Perhaps what is really needed is an American renaissance in
the study of religion in society in general and of religion in relation to law
and democratic governance in particular.
Second, the Enlightenment fundamentalist strategy of denying reli-
gious-ethical discourse admission to the public square should be rejected
as a violation of fundamental liberal premises and our republican charter.
Regarding the latter objection, as Professors Akhil Reed Amar and
Michael McConnell have shown,' 62 religious liberty was recognized as an
essential component of republican theory. Professor Amar has suggested
that the Bill of Rights fully embraced religious liberty and gave its pro-
tection to religious assemblies in no small measure in the hope that reli-
gion would educate "ordinary Citizens about their rights and duties."
16 3
Churches were local institutions where the democratic virtues and
majoritarian will could be forged and, when necessary, used to resist fed-
eral or state tyranny. Religious pluralism, as persuasively demonstrated
by Professor McConnell, was one of the objects of the religion clauses,
which James Madison had in mind.1" On that account, the republic is
best served not by state indifference to religion but by policies and actions
that help religious communities to flourish. 6 ' In light of the historical
161. See John F. Wilson et al., Foreword to PETER I. KAUFMAN, REDEEMING POLITICS at
ix (1990).
162. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and -Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
163. Amar, supra note 162, at 1210. Regarding the contemporary implications of this his-
torical purpose, Professor Amar writes:
The idea of popular education resurfaces over and over in the Bill of Rights. As
we have seen, each of the three intermediate associations it safeguards-church, mili-
tia, and jury-was understood as a device for educating ordinary Citizens about their
rights and duties. The erosion of these institutions over the last 200 years has created
a vacuum at the center of our Constitution. Thus, one of the main tasks for today's
constitutional theorists should be to explore ways this vacuum might be filled.
Id.
164. On this point, Professor McConnell has observed:
The Madisonian contribution, familiar to us from The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51, is
to understand factions, including religious factions, as a source of peace and stability.
If there are enough factions, they will check and balance one another and frustrate
attempts to monopolize or oppress, no matter how intolerant or fanatical any partic-
ular sect may be.
McConnell, supra note 162, at 1515.
165. The Madisonian confidence in religious faction and pluralism is in stark contrast to the
Anti-Federalist belief that religion would unite and homogenize the populations of the respec-
tive states through common religious and moral beliefs and practices. See HERBERT J. STOR-
ING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19-23 (1981). For the Anti-Federalists, the
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record and the most recent scholarship, the notion that religion ought to
be a private matter having little bearing upon public law and civic life has
been thoroughly discredited. In a similar fashion, the privatization of
moral controversy should be rejected both because it violates the princi-
ples of liberalism and because of the great harm that it causes to the
capacity of the political community to address and resolve contemporary
moral controversies. In this regard, giving civic form to Professor
Michael Perry's notion of public discourse as including an "ecumenical
political dialogue" would do much to advance the reconciliation of law
and religion. 1
66
Third, we must renew our commitment to the constitutional dignity
of religious liberty and religious pluralism. With respect to that dignity,
even the application of one of the most basic principles of textual exegesis
would give some significance to the location of the religion clauses in the
text of the First Amendment. Religious liberty is at least the constitu-
tional peer of the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses. Given
the democratic purposes of those liberties, a plausible construction of the
text alone would admit the constitutional relevance of religious belief and
practice to republican governance. With respect to religious pluralism,
the duty of government vis-a-vis religion should be directed toward maxi-
mum liberty. Regarding the Supreme Court's role, Professor McConnell
argues: "The Madisonian perspective points toward pluralism, rather
than assimilation, ecumenism, or secularism, as the organizing principle
of church-state relations. Under this view, the Supreme Court errs if it
attempts to calm or suppress religious fervor by confining it to the mar-
gins of public life." 167 Thus, to the extent that the political branches and
the courts actively seek or even quietly tolerate the systematic exclusion
practice of religion was essential to the formation and success of republican government. Ac-
cordingly, they demanded assurance that the federal government would have no legislative
power to disturb existing state establishments or the free exercise of religion. However, under
either the Madisonian or Anti-Federalist view, the political and moral function of religion was
indispensable to the success of the new nation.
166. See PERRY, supra note 74, at 83-127 (detailing conditions under which "a plurality of
religious/moral communities [might] together constitute a (pluralistic) political community").
While the realization of that polis is not entirely certain, Professor Perry is certain that if it
were to emerge it would also require "an ecumenical political tolerance." Id. at 128-38.
167. McConnell, supra note 162, at 1516. To correct that error, he suggests:
The Court should not ask, "Will this advance religion?," but rather, "Will this ad-
vance religious pluralism?" The Court should not ask, "Will this be religiously divi-
sive?," but rather, "Will this tend to suppress expression of religious differences?"
Most of all, the Court should extend its protection to religious groups that, because
of their inability to win accommodation in the political process, are in danger of
forced assimilation into our secularized Protestant culture.
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or marginalization of "religious people" from public policy discourse and
the rule of law, such conduct bears little resemblance to the American
democratic charter. But that is precisely what proponents of "liberal
fundamentalism" would have the state do. In their rejection of the con-
stitutional anthropology that sublates the First Amendment 68 and con-
sequently in their general denial of the public relevance of religion to
democratic governance, liberal fundamentalists repudiate the founda-
tions of the comity between law and religion. That settlement gave con-
stitutional form to a conception of the persona democratica, which not
only permits but encourages the contribution of moral and religious dis-
course to democratic governance. This readiness to nullify the political
dimension of religious liberty offers compelling evidence of the depth of
the antireligious bias that characterizes this form of secular
fundamentalism.
Finally, constitutional historians should continue to restore the au-
thentic church-state record and to proceed with the systematic decon-
struction of the revisionist history upon which the Supreme Court built
its wall of separation. Just as the Court has corrected the doctrinal biases
of its predecessors in the case of race and sex discrimination, so too may
the Rehnquist Court begin to repair the breach between law and religion
fully symbolized in Lemon v. Kurtzman 169 and in Employment Division
v. Smith 170 by abandoning those decisions at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity in favor of religious liberty and its liberal accommodation. One
can only hope that as the Court turns away from the antireligious bias of
the Warren and Burger Courts, that it will embrace the founders'
church-state settlement as much as possible.1 7 1 Accordingly, the Court
168. The constitutional status of religious liberty is grounded in an ideal anthropology, im-
plicit in the First Amendment, that acknowledges the spiritual dimension of the human per-
son, the rationality of religious belief, freedom of will and religious association, and the
inviolability of the individual conscience regarding religious belief. The religion clauses were
premised upon that anthropology and upon postulates drawn from natural theology and demo-
cratic theories that considered religious practice to be essential to the moral flourishing of
human society and the rule of law.
169. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
170. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
171. I do not mean to imply that the original power of the states to establish religion should
be restored. The principle of disestablishment is now undeniably (and rightly) constitutive of
our federal-state polity. Furthermore, given the structural modification of our federalism
caused by the Fourteenth Amendment and the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights
through the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, it is clear that the original
church-state settlement could not be followed today. However, the marginalization of reli-
gious faith and practice that has occurred in the last half-century is contrary to our deepest
political sentiments, notwithstanding efforts by certain members of the Supreme Court during
that period to revise our constitutional history and shape our church-state settlement accord-
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should defer to all reasonable legislative accommodations of religion in
public life and scrupulously avoid any indifference to the dignity of reli-
gious liberty.
172
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout this Article, I have illustrated an estrangement between
law and religion that is deeply rooted in an intellectual bias against reli-
gious belief and practice. As this bias is present in many influential
quarters, so too is the disaffection. I have argued that this is an ex-
tremely grave matter, which not only undermines the possibility of sub-
stantive interdisciplinary discourse between law and religion, but which
also oppresses religious liberty, violates the premises of liberalism, and
tends to frustrate meaningful public discussion, debate, and political de-
cision making. Unless reconciled, this disaffection threatens the rule of
law and the possibility of democratic governance.
When the primary institutions of republican government-its polit-
ical institutions, public school systems, universities, mass media, and law
schools-systematically disregard and degrade the public value of the
religious dimension of human experience, the nation is thereby seriously
wounded. When the Supreme Court lends its voice in support of that
marginalization, that wound is deepened. Public laws and constitutional
decisions that violate the deepest values and considered moral judgments
of the governed do more than alienate the political community; they sub-
vert and may eventually destroy the necessary conditions for democratic
governance. The rule of law simply cannot disregard the moral and reli-
gious horizon of the governed without placing the American democratic
experiment in ordered liberty in very serious jeopardy.
While the estrangement of law and religion impedes interdiscipli-
nary exchange, that fact alone creates the possibility for meaningful dia-
logue among academics. Further scholarly exposition of the alienation
by theologians, philosophers, legal anthropologists, historians, political
scientists, and constitutionalists could do much to reconcile law and reli-
gion. While that rapprochement is the object of the strategies presented
in the previous section, the heart of the matter is a deep and yet elusive
antireligious bias in certain quarters of postmodern American culture.
ing to a secular bias against religion. That recent distortion of the Constitution needs
correction.
172. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 175-94 (detailing account of "pluralist approach" to
religious freedom designed to correct distortion of "the false choice between secularism and
majoritarianism" and to protect citizens "against government-induced uniformity in matters of
religion").
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Until that cultivated sin of intellectual pride or antireligious bigotry is
recognized and expiated, the estrangement of law and religion may con-
tinue to deepen and further undermine religious liberty and, so too, all
the liberties enjoyed in our society.
